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INTRODUCTION

The disability of a person... is not only the lack of access to the courts, but
also the inability to participatein, control, or even understand the progression
and disposition of their lawsuit.
"The tolling statute reflects a considered legislative judgment that in enumerated circumstances the strong policy in favor ofprompt dispositionof disputes
must give way to the need to protect a plaintiff who is unable to protect himself
or herself."'

The Texas Legislature promulgated the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act ("MLIIA") 2 in 1977. 3 Legislators passed the
MLIIA in response to a perceived health care liability crisis manifested by a shortage of affordable medical malpractice insurance.4
The MLIIA includes measures to reduce the number and size of medical malpractice awards,5 such as a pre-suit notice requirement, informed consent restraints, limitations on the use of res ipsa loquitur, a
short statute of limitations period and a damages cap.6 In passing the
MLIIA, legislators theorized that such measures would allow insurers
to predict their liability which would stabilize or reduce medical malpractice insurance rates.7
Although the MLIIA may have curbed medical liability insurance
rates, today, twenty years after the Act's enactment, securing affordable medical liability insurance remains a challenge for health care
providers as insurance costs continue to rise.8 This result likely occurs
1. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Tzolar v.
International Jet Leasing, Inc., 283 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1996).

3. See Darrell L. Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act-A Survey and Analysis of Its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36
BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 266 (1984).
4. See TEX.REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02 (West Supp. 1996). See also
Keith, supra note 3, at 266 (stating health care providers were confronted with a socalled medical malpractice insurance crisis resulting in unreasonably high insurance
rates); Max Sherman & Michael L. Pate, The Texas Legislatureand Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 339 (1979) (stating that Texas legislators were concerned that medical malpractice insurance rates were drastically increasing and
available coverage declining); Thea Andrews, Infant Tolling Statues in Medical MalpracticeCases, 5 J. LEGAL MED., 469,469 n.4 (1984) (citing AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC
ASSOCIATION, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5-6
(1970)) (stating that medical malpractice litigation exploded in the mid-1960's and
dramatically affected the health care profession).

5. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. R. 759, 761 (1977).
6. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 4.01, 6.02, 7.01, 10.01, 11.02-11.05
(West Supp. 1996).
7. See Redish, supra note 5, at 761.
8. Scientific research on diseases, such as HIV, cancer and heart disease, combined with an aging population, a stymied economy, inflation, patients' lawsuits, physicians practicing defensive medicine and withdrawal of commercial insurers from the
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because the insurance crisis involves "a complex of problems involving interacting medical, legal, sociological, psychological, and economic factors. "9
In addition to insurance rates remaining high, victims of medical
malpractice, whose rights have been restricted by the tort reform,
challenge that the MLIIA is unconstitutional.' ° In response, some
courts have held specific MLIIA provisions are unconstitutional because they unduly restrict plaintiffs' rights to recover compensation
for injuries." Thus, while Texas courts agree that lowering medical
market are factors blamed for the large increases in health care costs. See generally
Page Keeton, Medical Negligence-The Standardof Care, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 351,
360 n.19 (1979) (citing factors blamed for the increase in claims as: technological and
scientific developments, a change in the doctor-patient relationship, a litigious society,
unmeritorious law suits, the rules of damages, and changes in the substantive law of
torts); Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factorson Medical MalpracticeInsurancePremiums, 27 INQUIRY 167, 167 (1990) (stating "Despite the
widespread interest in tort reforms, little published empirical evidence suggests that
any of them have resulted in lower premiums for physicians").
Regardless of the causes, reducing malpractice insurance rates remains an important goal today as patients typically rely on insurance to pay health care expenses. See
Larry A. "Max" Maxwell, An Annual Survey of Texas Law: Health Care Law, 48
SMU L. REV. 1303, 1322-23 (1995) (stating "The payment of health care most often
involves an insurance company, health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred
provider organization (PPO), or some other network arrangement that includes
payors and providers."). Not surprisingly, increased premium costs limit health care
providers' access to affordable coverage which in turn, limits patients' access to quality health care services. See Redish, supra note 5, at 761.
The effects of the malpractice insurance crisis are not limited to physicians; the crisis affects the entire health care system. To the extent that physicians are forced to avoid high-risk specialities or to relocate in areas with
lower insurance rates, patients are seriously prejudiced by the resulting maldistribution of medical care. Patients who remain able to obtain adequate
medical care also pay for the insurance crisis in the form of higher costs
passed on to them by the physicians.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. Redish, supra note 5, at 760 n.10 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS)73-88 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

4 (1973)).

10. See Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ
1985, no writ) (challenging the damages cap violates the open courts provision); Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen. Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983,
no writ) (challenging the statute of limitations violates the state and federal equal
protection clauses and grants special privileges and immunities to health care providers); Neagle v. Nelson, 658 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983) (challenging
the statute of limitations violates the due process and equal protection provisions),
rev'd on other grounds, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
11. See Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the medical
malpractice statute's damages cap violates the Texas Constitution, as applied to plaintiffs with common law causes of action); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D.
Tex. 1986) (holding the medical malpractice statute's damages cap imposed on plaintiffs with personal injury claims violated the federal and state equal protection
clauses); Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995) (holding the medical malpractice statute's limitations period was unconstitutional as applied to minors with common law causes of action); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (holding the
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insurance rates is a legitimate state goal, courts have also endeavored
to assure that victims receive compensation for injuries caused by
medical malpractice. In balancing these interests, courts have found
some of the means adopted by MLIIA legislators unnecessarily burden certain groups of plaintiffs.' 2
One group unfairly burdened by the MLIIA is minor medical
wrongful death claimants.' 3 The MLIIA requires minors to file
14
wrongful death claims by age fourteen or their claims will be barred.
This result occurs because the current MLIIA minority tolling provision, contained in the limitations provision, only provides that minors
birthdays to file, or
under the age of twelve have until their fourteenth
15
have filed on their behalf, a medical claim.
Lower courts agree that barring minors' medical wrongful death
claims not filed by age fourteen is inequitable and illogical. 16 Nevertheless, lower courts feel bound to apply the MLIIA as written and
feel confined by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Doctors Hospital,'7 upholding the authority of the Texas Legislature to
limit damage awards for medical wrongful death claims.' 8
medical malpractice statute's limitations period violated the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution as applied to minors with common law causes of action).
12. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding minors' claims are unreasonably
restricted); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (Tex. 1983) (holding the statute of limitations unreasonably restricted minors' causes of action); Felan v. Ramos, 857 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding the statute of limitations violated
the open courts provision as applied to mentally incompetent patients).
13. See Povolish v. Bethania Reg'l Health Care Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (barring the plaintiffs' medical wrongful death claim before
they reached ages eighteen and nineteen because the decedent mother died over two
years before the children fied a claim); Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding eighteen year old twin sons'
medical wrongful death claim was barred because they failed to file suit by age fourteen); Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (barring the plaintiff's medical wrongful death claim because he
failed to file suit by age fourteen). Notably,
Many states have reduced the number of allowable years between the time
of injury or discovery of injury and the date suit is filed. Special concerns
have been to limit the traditional rights of children to wait until they achieve
the age of majority and to restrict broad interpretations of the 'discovery' of
injury and responsibility for it.
Zuckerman et al., supra note 8, at 171.
14. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
15. See id.
16. See Povolish, 905 S.W.2d at 68; Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339-40.
17. 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).
18. See id. at 846. See also Povolish, 905 S.W.2d at 68 (stating the court felt bound
to bar a medical wrongful death claim because of the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Rose, and urging the court to reassess its position regarding minors' claims); Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339 (barring minors' medical wrongful death claims but stating,
"But for the rationale in Rose, we would be hard pressed to justify the constitutionality of article 4590i, §10 under an equal protection analysis" and urging the Texas
Supreme Court to revisit the issue of whether the MLIIA's statute of limitations vio-
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The Texas Supreme Court, however, in Sax v. Votteler,19 unanimously held that requiring minors to file personal injury suits by age
eight was unconstitutional.2" The court found the requirement unreasonably restricted minors' rights to receive compensation for medical
injuries and found it unreasonable to assume that an adult would always institute suit on a minor's behalf before statutes of limitations
run.2 ' Thereafter, the Texas Legislature amended the minority tolling
provision to permit minors with medical claims to institute suits until
they reach age fourteen.2 2 Again, the Texas Supreme Court, in Weiner
lates the equal protection clause by unreasonably restricting the class of minors from
instituting medical wrongful death suits).
19. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
20. See id. at 667.
21. See id. at 665-67.
22. The Sax court specifically held that article 5.82, § 4 of the Texas Insurance
Code was unconstitutional as applied to minors. See Sax, 658 S.W.2d at 667. See Act
of June 3, 1975, ch. 330 § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, repealed by Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, pt. 4, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039,
2064. The MLIIA minority tolling provision is identical to that contained in the Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals Act, the MLIIA's precursor, except that the MLIIA
allows minors under the age of twelve until their fourteenth birthdays to file claims,
whereas the Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals Act only allowed minors under the
age of six until their eighth birthday to file claims. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 663 n.1;
Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1984) (explaining that the provisions
found in the MLIIA are essentially the same as those in the Physicians, Podiatrists
and Hospitals Act); Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1995) (noting that
"the only significant difference between article 5.82 and section 10.01 is that section
10.01 extends the tolling period [for minors] from age six to age twelve.").
The first minority tolling clause, contained in the statute of limitations provision of
the Texas Insurance Code § 4, stated:
Notwithstanding any other law, no claim against a person or hospital covered by a policy of professional liability insurance covering a person licensed
to practice medicine or podiatry or certified to administer anesthesia in this
state or a hospital licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law, as
amended (Article 4437f, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), whether for breach
of express or implied contract or tort, for compensation for a medical treatment or hospitalization may be commenced unless the action is filed within
two years of the breach or the tort complained of or from the date the medical treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which
the claim is made is completed, except that minors under the age of six years
shall have until their eighth birthday in which to file, or have filed on their
behalf,such claim. Except as herein provided, this section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (West 1976) (emphasis added) repealed by TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996). The current minority
tolling provision provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is
the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is
completed; provided that, minors under the age of 12 shall have until their
14th birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim. Except
as herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
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v. Wasson, 3 held the limitations period was unconstitutional, as applied to minors instituting personal injury claims, because it prematurely cut off their causes of action and failed to afford them adequate
opportunities to institute suits.24 The Weiner court concluded that
limitations are tolled on minors' personal injury claims until they
reach majority.25
Similarly, the MLIIA arbitrarily restricts, minors' rights to institute
medical wrongful death suits and prematurely cuts off their causes of
action. Notably, neither MLIIA adult beneficiaries nor minors asserting nonmedical wrongful death claims are required to institute suit
while under a disability. In fact, under the Wrongful Death Act, similarly situated minors filing nonmedical wrongful death claims may toll
limitations until they reach majority.26 Further, the MLIIA allows
adult medical wrongful death beneficiaries two years from the date of
the defendant's tort to institute suit.27 Thus, minors filing medical
wrongful death claims are the only class of plaintiffs whose rights are
prematurely terminated.
The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Rose v. Doctors Hospital
may be distinguished from cases involving minors asserting medical
wrongful death claims on the basis that the restriction imposed by the

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.

art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).

Notably, the Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals Act established a two-year limitations period, "altered the tolling provisions traditionally applied to minors," and only
sought to restrict minors' rights. See Keith, supra note 3, at 267. The Act also sought
to abolish the discovery rule in medical malpractice claims only in cases where the
physician, podiatrist, anesthetist, or hospital was insured. See id.
23. 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
24. See id. at 319. Stating that the MLIIA's statute of limitations, as applied to
minors with personal injury claims, violated the open courts provision of the Texas
Constitution, the court explained that the legislature's amendment of the minority
tolling provision from age eight to age fourteen was inadequate. See id. at 318-19.
The court stated:
This one change in section 10.01 does not cure the constitutional infirmity
that we identified in article 5.82 in Sax. Whether a statute compels a child to
bring suit by age eight or by age fourteen is inconsequential because in
either instance a minor child is legally disabled from pursuing a suit on his
own. We do not doubt the Legislature's power to remove a minor's legal
disabilities and thus lower below eighteen the age at which a person may sue
on his or her own behalf, but the Court unanimously agrees that the Legislature did not do so in section 10.01.
Id. at 318-19.
25. See id. at 321.
26. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986); TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.031 (Vernon 1986). See also Lubaway v.
City of McLean, 355 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (holding that under Texas law,
the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 5526 (now section 16.003) applies to wrongful death actions).
27. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
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MLIIA on the Rose plaintiffs was reasonable. 2s In contrast, the restriction placed on minors with medical wrongful death claims is arbitrary and unreasonable. In Rose, the wrongful death beneficiaries
were not under a disability, had adequate time to institute suit, and
were not precluded from receiving compensation. 29 Rather, the
amount of compensation they could receive was limited. In contrast,
the unreasonable time bar imposed on minors asserting medical
wrongful death claims precludes them from receiving any compensation.3 ' While the Rose court correctly held the Texas Legislature may
constitutionally limit damage awards for statutory causes of action,32
Texas courts have also held the legislature may not arbitrarily single
out a class of plaintiffs and unreasonably restrict their rights to institute suits. 33 Thus, the legislative rationale in singling out a class of
disabled plaintiffs, minors asserting medical wrongful death claims,
and unreasonably restricting their rights to institute suit, is constitutionally suspect.
Not surprisingly, the Texas Supreme Court has resolved many issues
regarding how the MLIIA applies to wrongful death claims. For example, the Texas Supreme Court has addressed whether the MLIIA
or the Wrongful Death Act controls when medical negligence causes
death, whether limitations commence pursuant to the MLIIA or the
Wrongful Death Act, whether application of the MLIIA's limitations
period commencing when the defendant commits malpractice violates
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, and whether the
minority tolling provision applies when a decedent is a child, rather
28. In Rose, the statutory limit in question involved the amount of damages the
plaintiffs could recover, rather than whether they had an adequate time to institute
suit. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 843.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 846-47.

31. See Povolish v. Bethania Reg'l Health Care Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

32. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 842.
33. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. 1983) (holding the Texas Legislature
may not arbitrarily restrict minors' rights to file personal injury claims arising from
alleged medical malpractice); San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297
S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957) (holding a statute providing for the exclusion of grazing lands

and tracts of not less than six hundred forty acres from the water conservation district
and not excluding grazing lands under six hundred forty acres lacked a reasonable

basis for the discrimination against small landowners, and thus violated the equal protection clause); Lossing v. Hughes, 244 S.W. 556, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1922,

no writ) (holding that a statute prohibiting Texas counties from issuing licenses to
commercial motor vehicles with net carrying capacities over eight thousand pounds,
while exempting the same vehicles engaged in agricultural purposes from the statutory requirements violated the equal protection provision because "[tihe Legislature

cannot by its arbitrary fiat create such a classification" when no rational relationship
exists between the classification and the statutory purposes).
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than a beneficiary. 4
The Texas Supreme Court, in Bala v. Maxwell,35 held the MLIIA
applies to death claims arising from medical malpractice, that limitations on such claims commence pursuant to the MLIIA, and that application of the MLIIA limitations period does not violate the open
courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 36 In Baptist Memorial
Hospital System v. Arredondo,37 the court addressed whether the
MLIIA could constitutionally bar an adult's wrongful death claim because she failed to institute suit within two years of the defendant's
alleged act of medical malpractice, or whether the MLIIA minority
tolling provision preserved her claim because the decedent was a
child.38 The court held the MLIIA minority tolling provision applies
only to claims filed by a minor or on a minor's behalf, not to an adult's
claim and that the time restriction did not violate the open courts
provision.39
In sum, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the MLIIA and its
limitations provision applies to wrongful death claims premised on
medical malpractice, its minority tolling provision applies only to
claims filed by minors, and minors filing personal injury claims may
toll the commencement of limitations until they reach majority even
though the minority tolling provision states that it preserves minors'
claims only until they reach age fourteen. 40 However, the Texas
Supreme Court has not addressed whether the MLIIA may constitutionally terminate minors' rights to institute suits for statutory wrongful death claims at age fourteen or whether limitations are tolled until
they reach majority.
This comment explains how the derivative nature of death claims,
combined with the MLIIA's accrual dates and its minority tolling provision, result in premature termination of minors' rights to file wrongful death claims caused by medical malpractice. Section I of this
comment provides a brief explanation of events prompting the Texas
Legislature to enact the MLIIA and the provisions legislators included
in the statute to alleviate the perceived health care liability crisis. Sec34. See Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (holding the
MLIIA and its limitation provision, not the Wrongful Death Act and its limitations
provision, applies to medical wrongful death claims); Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (holding the MLIIA could constitutionally bar an adult's medical wrongful death claim because she failed to file suit
within two years of the health care provider's alleged negligence, even though she
fied suit within two years of the date of death).
35. 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
36. See id. at 892-93.
37. 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996).

38. See id. at 121.
39. See id. at 121-22.
40. See, e.g., Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam); Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Weiner v.
Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
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tion II discusses wrongful death causes of action and compares death
causes of action brought under the Wrongful Death Act with death
causes of action brought under the MLIIA. Section II also reviews
Texas Supreme Court decisions applying the MLIIA to wrongful
death claims. Section III surveys federal and state case law holding
specific provisions or applications of the MLIIA are unconstitutional.
Section IV reviews Texas case law interpreting and applying the
MLIIA minority tolling provision to medical wrongful death claims
brought by minor beneficiaries and by adult beneficiaries when minors are the decedents. In Section V, the author urges the Texas Legislature to amend the MLIIA minority tolling provision so that
limitations commence on all minors' claims at age eighteen. Alternatively, the author urges the Texas Supreme Court to hold the current
MLIIA minority tolling provision is unconstitutional, as applied to minors asserting medical wrongful death claims, because it violates the
equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution.
I. THE

HEALTH CARE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS

A. Increasing Medical Liability Insurance Rates
In the 1970's many people claimed an insurance crisis existed because health care providers' insurance rates increased while available
coverage declined." Notably, many commentators blamed the increased insurance rates on increased malpractice litigation and related
high damage awards.42
41. See Russell B. Power & Karl 0. Wyler, III, Patients' Compensation Fund And
The Bad Faith Cause Of Action: Two ProposedAmendments To The Medical Liability

And Insurance Improvement Act Of Texas, 17

TEx. TECH

L. REV. 1603, 1603-04

(1986).
42. See Keith, supra note 3, at 266-67. Commentators generally blamed "one or
another of the key players in the malpractice system: the physicians, the juries, the
court system as a whole, the plaintiffs' attorneys, or the cultural expectations about
medical care within the United States." James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 37, 37 (1986).
"What was also unclear in 1975, however, was the cause of this rise in medical
liability insurance rates. While there was unquestionably a problem in the medical
profession, it was unclear whether the insurance industry was actually facing a 'crisis'
caused by malpractice litigation." Keith, supra note 3, at 268 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In fact, several commentators noted:
The causes of these [insurance] problems have been widely disputed.
Some groups, including insurance companies, have blamed the rising premiums and reductions in coverage on rapidly rising and unpredictable liability
claims costs and have argued for tort reform to control escalating insurance
costs.... Others, such as consumer organizations, have pointed to insurance
company mismanagement and even have suggested that insurers colluded to
raise rates when the industry faced declining investment income due to reductions in interest rates ....
Scott Harrington & Robert E. Litan, Causesof the Liability InsuranceCrisis, SCIENCE,
Feb. 12, 1988, at 737 (citations omitted). Still other commentators blamed the malpractice insurance crisis on the way that insurance companies conducted business and
contended that the solution to the medical liability insurance crisis lay with improved
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Regardless of the cause of the cost increases, the perceived insurance crisis dramatically affected every facet of the health care profession.43 In attempting to reduce their liability, physicians responded to
the crisis by: (1) changing fields of practice to avoid high risk medical
insurance categories;" (2) limiting the scope of their practices;4 5 (3)47
entering early retirement; 46 (4) refusing to treat high risk patients; 48
(5) instituting countersuits against patients filing nuisance claims;
regulatory control over insurers. See J. Robert Hunter & Thomas C. Borzilleri, The
Liability Insurance Crisis, TRIAL, Apr. 1986, at 43-46. Yet others conceded that the
number of compensable injuries may cause malpractice insurance rates to rise, but
questioned whether such rises in medical liability insurance rates actually amounted
to a crisis. The noted legal economist James Posner explained:
The major underlying force driving malpractice costs is the number of
"compensable injuries" that occur. Many more injuries occur than are ever
compensated. Indeed, the liability system acts effectively to reduce the total
payments....
Every serious observer of the malpractice situation will concede that large
numbers of injuries ...

occur, and that society deems many of these to be

"compensable." . . .
Even while acknowledging the frequency and severity of serious injuries,
most observers would probably also agree that the quality of medical care on
an aggregate level in the United States is rather good. The probability of a
serious mistake that leads to damages over $1 million is about one in 100,000
hospital patients, and even lower in the doctor's office. For high risk areas of
medical care, such as obstetrics, there is a probability of approximately one
in 10,000 pregnancies leading to serious claims. In everyday life, people,
faced with such probabilities will often assume the risk without calling it a
"crisis," or feeling that the quality is essentially flawed.
Posner, supra at 52-53 (citations omitted).
43. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 469 n.4.
Pressure from malpractice insurance lobbyists, doctors and hospitals convinced the Texas Legislature that a medical malpractice insurance crisis existed, and that if immediate action was not taken skyrocketing insurance
rates would put malpractice insurance out of the reach of many Texas doctors and hospitals. As a result, some physicians or health care providers
either ceased or reduced the scope of their practice of medicine, thus making
medical care unavailable to thousands of Texans.
Keith, supra note 3, at 267 (citations omitted).
44. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1605.
45. See id. at 1604-05.
46. See id. Proclaiming the medical liability insurance crisis was his top legislative
priority in 1977, Texas Governor Dolph Briscoe stated:
Older doctors are encouraged, if not forced, to retire prematurely because of
high insurance rates and lack of availability of insurance (to protect doctors
against claims for medical malpractice).
Many doctors in rural areas who occasionally perform surgical procedures
as adjuncts to their general practice cannot afford the rates and have ceased
the service. Care of indigents and emergency patients is threatened because
of the high increase in insurance rates for doctors who traditionally have
volunteered much of this service.
Sherman & Pate, supra note 4, at 341 (quoting Tex. H.R.J. 111 (1977)).
47. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1605.
48. See id.
Increased numbers of medical malpractice suits, damage awards and malpractice insurance premiums during the 1970's intensified the medical pro-
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and (6) practicing defensive medicine.4 9 As insurance rates rose, the
fession's concern and search for a 'legal remedy available to physicians
subjected to allegedly "wrongful" "meritless," "frivolous," or "bad faith"
medical malpractice suits. . . Physicians considered these suits were instituted by former patients for several groundless reasons, including mere general principles arising solely from a bad medical result and breakdown in the
physician-patient relationship, unreasonable patient expectations of the physician, creation of a nuisance or harassment, to extract settlements, to prevent physicians from suing on an unpaid bill, or only to obtain a physician's
testimony against another physician, rather than seeking damages for alleged malpractice. In addition, a medical profession paranoia developed
among physicians who believed doctors were sued too frequently, plaintiffs
were easily successful in malpractice cases, jury verdicts against doctors were
universally large, and defendant-physicians' reputations were always damaged by the suit.
Convinced that successfully defending or forcing plaintiff-patients to dismiss malpractice cases were inadequate remedies and deterrents to meritless
or bad faith malpractice suits, physicians who considered themselves wrongfully sued strategically developed an active means of counter attack to discourage patients and their lawyers from filing or prosecuting such lawsuits,
and to establish a remedy for the so-called "wrongfully sued" physician.
This legal tactic became popularly known as the "physician countersuit" to
malpractice actions. In some parts of the country, state and local medical
societies established or planned organized funding for physician countersuits. At the national level, the American Medical Association's House of
Delegates resolved that "appropriate assistance should be given to the physicians who countersue following frivolous malpractice suits. [sic] Physician
countersuits are commonly based upon legal theories of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, prima facie tort, barratry, third party attorney negligence or legal malpractice, constructive contempt of court,
frivolous suit filing, invasion of privacy, and violation of physician's federal
constitutional rights under the Civil Rights Act.
Keith, supra note 3, at 310-12 (citations omitted). However, most physician's countersuits have been unsuccessful because physicians failed to allege proper damages, to
prove causation, or to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 31416. Further, physician's rights to file countersuits against patients must be weighed
against a patient's right to free access to courts. See id. at 318. Moreover, Texas
courts have been concerned that these types of countersuits are against public policy
and will deter patients from filing valid claims. See id. Finally,
Claims by the medical profession that substantial numbers of meritless malpractice suits contributed to the alleged malpractice 'crisis' have not been
borne out statistically, and serious doubt exists as to the impact of malpractice actions on physicians' reputations. Insufficient evidence exists to relate
meritless or groundless suits to increased litigation, damage awards and malpractice insurance rates or other burdens associated with defending lawsuits.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the physician's countersuit against
a patient and the patient's attorney for malicious prosecution and abuse of process
against patient did not state a cause of action); Moiel v. Sanlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (holding the physician had no cause of action for malicious prosecution, barratry, abuse of process, and negligence against patient and patient's attorney for instituting malpractice suit).
49. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1604-05. The medical liability crisis "led
many physicians to practice defensive medicine which subjects the patient to repetitive diagnostic tests and x-rays and fails to make use of newly developed but successful medical techniques." Andrews, supra note 4, at 469 n.4. The sole purpose of
defensive medicine is corroboration of the physicians treatment, diagnosis and proce-
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public experienced a decline in the number of physicians willing to
practice in areas that insurance companies designated high risk.50
Over time, health care became more expensive and less accessible as
physicians decreased the scope of their practices and passed along rising insurance fees to the general public.5 '
B.

Controlling Statutes Before the Health Care Liability Insurance
Crisis
In Texas, before 1975, medical malpractice claims were pursued
under contract or tort theories, such as oral contract to cure, breach of
warranty, negligence, assault, battery, and wrongful death. 2 Plaintiffs
filing medical malpractice claims had two years from the accrual of an
action to file claims.53 Further, plaintiffs filing medical malpractice
claims could employ the discovery rule to file claims within two years
of the date they knew or should have known they were injured 54 and a
disability tolling55 provision permitted minors to toll the commencedures. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1604. Corroboration may provide protection for physicians sued for malpractice by negating the breach of duty element in
a negligence case. Through corroboration, a physician attempts to show he acted in
conformity with a reasonable physician standard and did not breach the duty of care
owed a patient. Ironically, the practice of defensive medicine actually increased the
costs of medical care, which in turn, raised insurance rates. See id. Thus, medical
liability insurance rates increased as a consequence of physicians' and insurers'
heightened fear of liability. See id.
50. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1605. High risk areas included obstetrics-gynecology, orthopedics, and neurosurgery. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 8,
at 169; Posner, supra note 42, at 46.
51. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 469 n.4.
52. See Craig M. Van De Mark et al.,
Limitations, 22 Hous. L. REV. 319, 320
(1985). "The curtailment of such [patients'] rights has steadily increased since 1975,
with special protection from liability being granted to tortfeasors if they are within the
definition of 'physicians' or 'health care providers' found in section 1.03(3) of the
Medical Liability Act." Keith, supra note 3, at 267.
53. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.art. 5526 (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN.§ 16.003 (Vernon 1986)).
54. See Joseph P. Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice,10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419,421 (1979). At common law
and before the MLIIA became effective, Texas courts applied the discovery rule to
toll statutes of limitations on medical malpractice claims until the patient discovered,
or should have discovered, the alleged malpractice. See Robinson v. Weaver, 550
S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (Tex. 1977); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967).
Although the Keeton Study Commission recommended a modified discovery rule be
included in the MLIIA to grant plaintiffs one year to institute suit from the date they
discover or reasonably should discover their injuries, the legislature rejected the recommendation, opting instead for the two-year absolute limitations period currently
contained in the Act. See Witherspoon, supra at 421-22. Once the MLIIA was enacted, medical malpractice plaintiffs have been held to an absolute two-year limitations period. See Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985). Further,
limitations generally run from the date of injury, regardless of when the injured patient discovers his injuries. See id. at 208.
55. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1986). "Tolling is the
process whereby a legislature or a court will provide that a statute of limitations is
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56
ment of limitations until attaining majority.

C.

The ProfessionalLiability Insurance for Physicians, Podiatrists
and Hospitals Act and the Keeton Study Commission

During the 1970's, legislators around the country were warned that
a medical liability insurance crisis existed.57 Insurance companies,
physicians' organizations, and health care providers began lobbying
for substantive and procedural tort reform to curb the crisis. 58 As a
temporary solution, the Texas Legislature passed the Physicians,
Podiatrists and Hospitals Act in 1975.59 Simultaneously, the legisla-

ture created the Texas Medical Professional Study Commission
("Commission") to evaluate the problem, compile a report, and make
for long-term solutions to the Sixty-fifth Texas
recommendations
60
Legislature.
By the end of 1976, the Commission's completed report was
presented to the legislature.6 ' The Commission suggested a plan for
temporarily suspended or stopped. Often, tolling provisions are allowed for insanity,
infancy, incapacity, fraud, or discovery." Susan S. Septimus, The Concept of Continuous Tort As Applied to Medical Malpractice: Sleeping Beauty or Slumbering Beast for
Defendant, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 71, 76 n.28 (1986).
56. See Van De Mark, supra note 52, at 320 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5535 (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon
1986))). Article 5535 provided:
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this
title be at the time the cause of action accrues ... a minor... the time of
such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the
commencement of the action and such person shall have the same time after
the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of this
title.
Id. In Texas, majority is attained at age eighteen. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN.§ 129.001 (Vernon 1986) (formerly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5923(b) § 1).
57. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1603. State legislators, in response to the
rising cost and unavailability of medical malpractice insurance, passed tort reform
laws in every state except West Virginia. See David Randolph Smith, Battling A Receding Tort Frontier: ConstitutionalAttacks On Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA.
L. REV. 195, 200-01 (1985).
58. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1603-04.
59. TEX. INS. CODE ANN.art. 5.82 (Vernon 1976) (Ch. 330, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws
864), repealed by TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1996). The Legislature specifically provided that the Act would be temporary and allowed it to expire
by its own terms on December 31, 1977. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652
S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1983).
60. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1605-06.
The Study Commission had a threefold purpose: to recommend steps that
would insure the availability of professional liability insurance for Texas
health care providers; to investigate the reasons for the mounting premium
costs for medical liability insurance; and to make recommendations to the
legislature designed to lower the costs of this insurance to more acceptable
levels.
Keith, supra note 3, at 269.
61. See Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1606. The Commission became commonly known as the Keeton Commission, named after its Chairman, W. Page Keeton,
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early identification of unmeritorious claims through negotiation,
mandatory screening boards to encourage early settlements and to filter out nuisance suits, and a pre-suit notice requirement of sixty
days.62 These suggestions resulted from Commission findings that a
large percentage of malpractice claims were unmeritorious. 63 Moreover, the Commission concluded the cost associated with handling,
processing, and defending claims was largely responsible for the increased insurance rates.' The Commission's recommendations, in
large part, were incorporated into the MLIIA's purposes and findings
the Dean of the University of Texas School of Law. See Keith, supra note 3, at 268.
Interestingly, the Commission found several problems at the core of the medical malpractice crisis: medical and hospital negligence, a litigious society and a need for insurance reform. See id. at 269.
62. See Keith, supra note 3, at 271-78. See also Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 936-37.
63. See Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 936-37. Notably, while the Keeton Report focused
on tort reform as the solution to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, it "also
recommended changes in the medical and insurance industries." Keith, supra note 3,
at 270. For example, the Commission suggested that malpractice occurs when physicians attempt to treat too many patients and suggested a reduction in physician-patient ratios. See id. at 277 (citing Final Report of the Texas Medical Professional
Liability Study Commission to the 65th Texas Legislature,December 1976 at 27) [hereinafter Keeton Report]. In addition, the Commission's evidence indicated that state
medical boards were sometimes lax in permanently stripping a negligent physician of
his license. See id. at 279. Further, the Committee's Minority and Majority Report
documented the insurance industry's failure to cooperate with the Commission's attempt to solve the insurance crisis. See id. at 269 (citing Keeton Report, supra at 45).
As a result, "The Study Commission admitted that its investigation of the effects of
the malpractice insurance 'crisis' on the availability of health care services to Texas
was hampered by the unavailability or absence of reliable statistics concerning the
availability of such services in general." Id. at 271. The Majority Report even stated
that the data was inconclusive and failed to substantiate the insurance industry's allegation that it suffered losses due to the filing of medical malpractice claims, rather
than by poor investments. See id. at 270. Moreover, "there was some evidence before
the Study Commission indicating that losses suffered by medical malpractice insurance companies in the mid-1970's were the culmination of a series of bad investments
in 1973 and 1974." Id. (citing Keeton Report, supra at 38). Not surprisingly, some
critics questioned the accuracy of the legislative findings concerning the existence of
significant reductions in available health care based on the Keeton Commission's Report because of the absence of statistical data proving that a causal connection existed
between medical malpractice insurance premiums and the continued availability of
health care services. See id. at 271.
Nevertheless, the Texas Legislature chose to justify the Act's shortened statute of
limitations upon data presented to other state legislatures by the medical profession,
hospitals, and insurance companies. See Witherspoon, supra note 54, at 429. Even
more surprisingly,
The legislature did not focus upon whether the two year 'absolute statute of
limitations provided a reasonable time within which medical malpractice
claims could be initiated." Neither did the legislature focus upon the nature
of the country's medical malpractice crisis or consider how the majority of
the patients affected by the foreshortened statute of limitations could bear
the great economic and personal losses that would result. The legislature did
not establish that the radical modification of the tort law system was required over other alternative measures available.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. See Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 937.
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section 65 and have provided guidance to courts interpreting and applying the statute. 66
D. The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas
The MLIIA became effective on September 1, 1977.67 The stated
purposes of the MLIIA include: (1) reducing the frequency and severity of health care liability claims; (2) decreasing the costs of malpractice insurance; (3) protecting health care providers from liability
through affordable insurance; and (4) ensuring the public access to
affordable health care.68 In passing the MLIIA, the Texas Legislature
recognized that "rising insurance premiums, along with soaring malpractice claims and skyrocketing damage awards, adversely affect the
quality and cost of health care in Texas."' 69 Legislators included the
following procedural and substantive changes in the MLIIA: (1) a
pre-suit notice requirement; 70 (2) limitation of the use of res ipsa lo65. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(1)-(13) (West Supp. 1996).
66. See Roger M. Baron, Knee-Deep in the Hoopla: A Decade of Litigation Under
the 1977 Texas Statute of Limitations on Medical MalpracticeClaims, 51 TEX. B. J. 258
(1988).
67. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.art. 4590i, § 1.02 (West Supp. 1996).
68. See id. § 1.02(b)(1)-(7) (West Supp. 1996). See also Battaille v. Yoffe, 882
S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983).
69. Power & Wyler, supra note 41, at 1607.
70. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (West Supp. 1996). See also
Burdett v. Methodist Hosp., 484 F. Supp. 1338, 1340-41 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (stating the
sixty-day written pre-suit notice requirement was intended to encourage settlement of
disputes without litigation and not as a condition precedent to filing suit and thus
failure to give notice prior to suit does not bar an otherwise meritorious claim);
Thompson v. Community Health Inv. Corp., 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996) (holding
proper pre-suit notice given within the two-year limitations period tolls the running of
limitations for seventy-five days as to health care providers who actually receive notice as well as to all potential parties); Hutchinson v. Wood, 657 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.
1983) (holding the failure to comply with the sixty-day pre-suit notice requirement
requires suspension of a cause of action until the plaintiff complies); Schepps, 652
S.W.2d at 938 (holding plaintiffs must give sixty days written notice prior to filing
suit); Rhodes v. McCarron, 763 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied)
(holding a health care liability claim filed within statutes of limitations may be maintained despite non-compliance with the sixty-day written notice requirement, but the
cause of action is abated for sixty days to allow compliance); Wilbourn v. University
Hosp., 642 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ) (holding compliance with
the notice requirement is mandatory); McClung v. Komorom, 629 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding notice by certified mail,
return receipt requested, becomes effective when mailed and tolls statutes of limitations for seventy-five days). Interestingly, "The effect of section 4.01 of the Medical
Liability Act is to make 'health care providers' the only private class of tortfeasors
who must be given sixty days advance notice of a claim prior to filing of suit." Keith,
supra note 3, at 286. Furthermore, while the sixty-day written pre-suit notice requirement was intended to encourage settlement negotiations, it failed to impose sanctions
on health care providers failing to comply with plaintiffs' requests for medical records.
See id. at 285-86.
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quitur;7 ' (3) informed consent ,constraints;72 (4) a cap on damage
awards; 73 (5) abolition of the discovery rule; 74 and (6) inclusion of an
71. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 7.01-.02 (West Supp. 1996). See
also Westerlund v. Naaman, 883 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ) (holding the MLIIA limited the application of the common law doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to types of health care liability claims in which the doctrine had already
been applied by Texas appellate courts); Haddock v. Arnspiger, 763 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (holding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only applies in
medical malpractice actions when alleged negligent action and injuries are within the
common knowledge of laymen); Miller v. Hardy, 564 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.- El
Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding an instrumentality causing injury must be proved
to have been under the control and management of the health care defendant); Williford v. Banowsky, 563 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, ref d n.r.e.)
(holding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally inapplicable to medical malpractice actions but may be employed when the alleged malpractice and the injury are
within common knowledge and may be proved without expert testimony, such as operating on the wrong body part, leaving sponges or instruments within the body or
negligent operation of mechanical instruments); Forney v. Memorial Hosp., 543
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur only applies in medical malpractice actions when both the malpractice and the injuries are plainly within the common knowledge of laymen).
72. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.01-.07 (West Supp. 1996). See
also, Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1995, writ denied) (finding MLIIA procedures for obtaining informed consent are
rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in controlling costs of malpractice
litigation); Green v. Thiet, 846 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied)
(holding the purpose of the disclosure rule is protecting patients against unknown
injuries resulting from treatment which, if known, the patient could have avoided
through non-treatment and holding that informed consent issues are determined on a
negligence theory, not on assault and battery theories); Melissinos v. Phamanivong,
823 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied) (defining informed consent
as including only a negligence theory of recovery and not including a common law
cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation, which forms a separate basis for recovery and must be plead and proved independently); Forney, 543 S.W.2d at 706 (holding
a plaintiff must prove that obtaining informed consent was an accepted practice in the
community where the cause of action arose). Notably, the MLIIA "redefined the
theory of recovery in informed consent cases and established the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel" that evaluates medical and surgical disclosures and procedures. Keith,
supra note 3, at 291.
73. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.01-.05 (West Supp. 1996). See
also Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the MLIIA
statutory cap on damage awards violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690-92 (Tex. 1988) (holding the
MLIIA could not constitutionally limit a patient's damages recovery to alleviate the
malpractice insurance crisis and that the statute violated the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (N.D. Tex.
1986) (holding the MLIIA's $500,000 damages cap violated both state and federal
equal protection and due process clauses because it discriminated against classes of
litigants and operated to restrict their rights to receive full redress for injuries); Detar
Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)
(holding the MLIIA's damages cap is unconstitutional as it unreasonably restricts
plaintiffs' redress for injuries).
74. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996). See also
Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985) (holding the failure to file a medical malpractice claim within the MLIIA's two-year limitations period barred recovery
as the legislature intended to abolish the discovery rule when it eliminated the word
"accrual" from the language of the statute); Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 22
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absolute' 5 two-year statute of limitation.' 6 Further, legislators defined
health care broadly to encompass any care or treatment that was or
should have been furnished by a health care provider. 77 Likewise, leg(Tex. 1977) (holding a plaintiff filing a malpractice suit for negligent diagnosis was
time-barred by the MLIIA two-year statute of limitations because the discovery rule
did not apply to misdiagnosis claims); Allen v. Tolon, 918 S.W.2d 605, 607-08 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1996, no writ) (noting the MLIIA abolished the discovery rule); Winkle v. Tuilos, 917 S.W.2d 304, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
("The discovery rule has been abolished in cases governed by the Act."); Lamar v.
Graham, 598 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Waco 1980), writ dism'd, improvidently
granted, 639 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1982) (holding a plaintiff filing a malpractice suit for
negligent diagnosis was time-barred because his cause of action accrued at the time of
the alleged misdiagnosis and the plaintiff failed to file a claim within two years of the
diagnosis). But see Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984) (holding the
MLIIA's limitations period unconstitutional when it cuts off an injured person's right
to sue before he has a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong and file suit);
LeGesse v. Primacare, 899 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied)
(holding that while the open courts provision permits plaintiffs to have a reasonable
time to sue after discovering their injuries, their actions will nonetheless be barred
when they fail to timely file suit, such as waiting one year to file a claim after discovering their injuries); Deluna v. Rizkallah, 754 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (holding MLIIA's two-year statute of limitations barring a
plaintiff's right of redress in the courts for medical malpractice claims was an unconstitutional violation of the open courts provision where the plaintiff could not discover
his injury within the two-year limitation period); Tsai v. Wells, 725 S.W.2d 271, 273
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding the open courts provision
creates a modified discovery rule and prevents a plaintiff's cause of action from being
barred by the two-year limitation period of the MLIIA when he lacked a reasonable
opportunity to discover the wrong); Neagle v. Nelson, 658 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (holding statute of limitations restricting a plaintiffs right of redress for a sponge left in his
abdomen was unconstitutional as violative of the open courts provision).
75. Section 10.01 of the MLIIA "is 'absolute' because the provision eliminates the
right to commence an action for medical malpractice although the patient did not
know and could not reasonably have discovered within the two year period that he or
she had suffered a medical injury due to malpractice." Witherspoon, supra note 54, at
427. However, a number of states, such as Washington, have refused to adopt an
absolute limitations period, choosing instead to allow a patient at least one year from
the time he discovers or should have discovered his injuries to fie suit. See id.
76. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996). See also
Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987) (holding a plaintiff who failed to
bring suit within two years from the date of the medical tort was time-barred because
the statute of limitations commences on the date of the tort when the specific date is
known, rather than on the last date of treatment); Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205,
207 (Tex. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of the MLIIA's two-year:statute of
limitations where the plaintiff discovered his injuries within two years following the
tort); Weatherby v. Scenic Mountain Med. Ctr., 896 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1995, writ denied) (holding MLIIA's absolute two-year statute of limitations period
abolishes the discovery rule); Adkins v. Tafel, 871 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1994, no writ) (holding the statutes of limitations contained in the MLIIA did
not violate the open courts provision where the plaintiff was aware of his injury
before the two year limitations period expired).
77. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(4) (West Supp. 1996). Health
care is defined as "any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have
been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a
patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Id. § 1.03(2).
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islators defined health care liability claims as:
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for
treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or health care or safety which
proximately results in injury to or death of the patient, whether
78 the
patient's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.

Nevertheless, legislators set out three possible dates for aiding
plaintiffs in ascertaining when limitations commence.79 Under the
Act, a suit must be filed within two years of one of three dates: "(1)
the occurrence of the breach or tort; (2) the date the health care treatment that is the subject of the claim is completed; or (3) the date the
hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed. '8 ° However,
the general rule is that limitations commence on the date of the tort's
occurrence.8 ' Only if the date of the tort is unknown may limitations
commence on the last date of treatment or hospitalization.8 z In sum,
legislators enacted the MLIIA theorizing that reducing the number
and size of malpractice awards would allow the insurance industry to
predict recoveries which would lead to reasonable premium rates.8 3

Medical care is defined as "any act defined as practicing medicine in Article 4510,
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended, performed or furnished, or which
should have been performed, by one licensed to practice medicine in Texas, for, to, or
on behalf of a patient during the patient's care, treatment, or confinement." Id.
§ 1.03(6). A health care provider includes, "any person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institution, duly licensed or chartered by the State
of Texas to provide health care as a registered nurse, hospital, dentist, podiatrist,
pharmacist, or nursing home, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the
course and scope of his employment." Id. § 1.03(3).
78. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(4) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis
added).
79. See id. § 10.01. See also Osborne v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 915 S.W.2d
906 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Magness v. Hauser, 918
S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Casey v. Methodist
Hosp., 907 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Gomez v. Carreras, 904 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Adkins v. Tafel, 871
S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ); Damron v. Ornish, 862 S.W.2d
683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied); Rivera v. Mitchell, 764 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, no writ); Reed v. Wershba, 698 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Vinklarek v. Cane, 691 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Adkins, 871 S.W.2d at 292 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i,
§ 10.01 (Vernon Supp. Pamph. 1994)).
81. See Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987).
82. See id.; Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996) ("When the precise date of the tort is known, the statutory two-year period begins on that date.");
Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, no writ) ("Should a
specific date for the negligent act be capable of being ascertained, that date is the one
from which the limitations period begins to run.").
83. See Redish, supra note 5, at 761.
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DEATH CAUSES OF AcTION

Wrongful Death Act and MLIIA Wrongful Death Causes of
Action

Virtually all death causes of action are created by statute.84 At
common law, a personal injury action did not survive death."5 Hence,
no cause of action could be brought for the death of another person
and no recovery existed once a tort victim died.8 6 "The result was that
it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him,
and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of
the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy. '87 Be-

cause such an outcome was intolerable, every state has since enacted
wrongful death statutes permitting victims' families to obtain compensation for wrongful acts causing deathYm Texas enacted its wrongful
84. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 127, at 945-46 (5th ed. 1984). While virtually all causes of action for wrongful death
are created by federal or state statutes, courts created a cause of action for wrongful
death in admiralty law. See id.
85. See id. See also Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. 1992)
("At common law, an individual's action for personal injuries did not survive his
death."); Young v. Jones Lumber Co., 784 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stating Texas never had a common law cause of action
for wrongful death).
86. See KEETON, ET AL., supra note 84, at 945-46.
87. See id. at 945. See also In re McCoy, 373 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D. Tex. 1974)
(stating that death statutes are intended to compensate statutory beneficiaries for
their own losses resulting from the death).
88. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 84, at 945-46. See ALA.CODE § 6-5-410 (1996);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (Michie 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-612 (West
1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-112 (Michie 1995); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.60
(West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9-6-104 (West 1996); CorNm. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-555 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3701 (West 1996); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2701 (West 1996); FLA.STAT. ANN.§ 768.19 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 514-2 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-3 (Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE § 5-311
(West 1996); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/0.01 (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-

1-1-2 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601901 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (West 1996); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2315.2 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104-C (West 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRO. § 3-904 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2
(West 1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 573.02 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 117-13 (West 1996); MONT.CODE ANN. § 27-1-501, -513 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-809 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:12
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-97 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Michie
1996); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 28A-18-2 (Michie 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (West 1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West
1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 (West
1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op.
1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106
(West 1996); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (West 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-12 (West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (West 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-50 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.010 (West 1996); W.
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death statute in 1860.89

Nonetheless, the MLIIA creates a separate statutory cause of action
for death caused by medical malpractice.90 Thus, a MLIIA death
claim and a Wrongful Death Act claim are separate and independent
statutory causes of action. 91 Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court
holds the Wrongful Death Act does not apply to wrongful death actions stemming from medical malpractice because the MLIIA is preemptory.92 Thus, the rights of wrongful death beneficiaries vary
VA. CODE

§ 55-7-5 (West 1996); Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 895.03 (West 1996); Wyo.

STAT.

ANN. § 1-38-101 (Michie 1996).

89. See Max E. Roesch & Warren Wayne Harris, The Statutory Shield to a Beneficiary's Cause of Action Under The Texas Wrongful Death Statute, 54 TEX. B. J. 1010
(1991).
The Texas scheme for death actions includes a survival cause of action and
a wrongful death cause of action. The difference between the two actions
lies in the beneficiaries and the damages. A survival action is brought by the
decedent's estate to redress the decedent's own injuries. A wrongful death
action is brought by the statutory beneficiaries to compensate them for their
loss of future care, maintenance, and support.
Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 795 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1990), affd, 841 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. 1992).
90. See, e.g., Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 892-93. Under the MLIIA, the same accrual dates and limitations
periods that apply to plaintiffs' personal injury claims likewise apply to plaintiffs'
wrongful death claims. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp.
1996). Like the Texas Supreme Court the Arizona Supreme Court has attempted to
reconcile its medical malpractice statute with its wrongful death statute. See James v.
Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d 695, 701-03 (Ariz. 1987). The James court noted
that other states have addressed similar problems, stating:
We note that other state courts have been asked to reconcile legislation
aimed at curtailing medical malpractice claims with pre-existing statutes governing the cause of action for wrongful death. The uncertainity usually
arises because the medical malpractice legislation did not expressly amend
the wrongful death statute, yet made reference to actions for death resulting
from medical malpractice. The state courts have recognized that the issue
must be decided by construing the intent of the state legislature in enacting
the restrictive medical malpractice statute and the effect of such a statute, if
any, upon the right to bring a wrongful death action. Although no clear
weight of authority has developed in these other jurisdictions as to whether
the medical malpractice accrual date and statute of limitations should apply
or the wrongful death accrual date and statute of limitations should apply
when the genesis of the wrongful death action was medical malpractice, two
general trends are discernible.
In one direction are those states that adhere to their prior interpretations
of the wrongful death statutes and hold that the cause of action for wrongful
death is separate and independent from the decedent's action for personal
injury and therefore controlled exclusively by the statutory procedures of
the wrongful death statute. As a claim independent from the decedent's personal injury claim, the cause of action for wrongful death in most of these
states would not be time-barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations for the personal injury claim before the date of death.
In the other direction are courts which interpret the medical malpractice
statute consistent with legislative intent to impose constraints on malpractice
actions so that wrongful death actions arising from medical malpractice are
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according to which statute governs their claims.
Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, a death cause of action is
derivative.93 A derivative status confers a wrongful death right of action upon the decedent's beneficiaries only if the decedent could have
maintained a personal injury action if he had lived.9' Conversely, if
the decedent's claim was time-barred, the beneficiary's claim will likewise be time-barred.9 5 Thus, a beneficiary steps into the shoes of the
decedent. Under the Wrongful Death Act, a death cause of action
accrues and limitations commence upon death rather than upon the
occurrence of a tort.96 Further, beneficiaries have two years from the
date of death to institute suit, provided the decedent could have maintained a personal injury action.97 However, when the beneficiary is a
procedurally controlled by the malpractice provisions. In many of these
states, causes of action for wrongful death derive from the decedent's personal injury action so that the failure to file a personal injury claim within
the statute of limitations period would subsequently time-bar a wrongful
death action. The application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations to the wrongful death claim is consistent with an accrual date as the
date of the injury.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1986). See also
Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 345 (stating wrongful death actions are derivative of the decedent's rights).
94. The Texas Wrongful Death Act provides:
(a) An action for actual damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death may be brought if liability exists under this section.
(b) A person is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death if the injury was caused by the person's or his agent's or servant's wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1986). The Act further provides: "This subchapter applies only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived." Id. § 71.003(a). Designating
beneficiaries, the Act states: "An action to recover damages as provided in this subchapter is for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and parents of
the deceased." Id. § 71.004(a).
95. See Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 348. A beneficiary is subject to the same defenses
that could have been asserted against the decedent. See id.
96. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986). See also
Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1990).
97. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon 1986). "A person
must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in an
action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the
injured person." Id. § 16.003(b). The two-year limitations period is only applied if the
decedent could have instituted suit if he had lived. See Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
795 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), affd, 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.
1992) (reconciling two provisions governing wrongful death claims and reading
§ 71.003(a) as governing the right to file a wrongful death suit and § 16.003(b) as
governing the time period for filing a wrongful death suit, such that if no right to file a
wrongful death suit exists under § 71.003(a) because limitations would have barred
the decedent's personal injury claim if he had lived, then § 16.003(b), conferring two
years to file a wrongful death claim upon the decedent's beneficiaries, is not applicable). See id. at 248 (holding the decedent's beneficiaries wrongful death suit was

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

21

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

child, limitations are tolled until he reaches majority.'a Therefore,
under the Wrongful Death Act, limitations commence on a minor's
wrongful death claim when his disability is removed. 99
Under the MLIIA, a wrongful death cause of action is considered
derivative, but a beneficiary has two years from the date a health care
provider injures the decedent to institute suit, whether or not the injury immediately causes death.'l° The general rule under the
MLIIA's three-date accrual schedule is that limitations commence
upon the occurrence of a medical tort, not at the time of death.'
Noticeably absent from the MLIIA's three-date accrual schedule is
any language referring to limitations commencing at the time of
death.0 2 Furthermore, the legislature delineated exceptions within
the Act where tolling may apply.' 0 3 While minority is a delineated
exception, 04 death is not listed as an exception conferring additional
filing time. In contrast to the Wrongful Death Act, the MLIIA only
allows a child to toll the commencement of limitations until he reaches
age twelve. 10 5 Hence, unlike a minor with a nonmedical death claim,
a minor with a medical death claim may be foreclosed from filing suit
while he remains under a disability.
B.

MLIIA Wrongful Death Cases

Texas courts hold the Wrongful Death Act is preempted by the
MLIIA based on the MLIIA's preemptory language stating it applies
barred because limitations had run on the decedent's personal injury claim before his
death).
98. See Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 665 F.2d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 1982)
"Although Texas has a two-year statute of limitations covering wrongful death actions
... that statute does not run during the period of a plaintiff's minority." Id.; Bangert

v. Baylor College of Med., 881 S.W.2d 564, 566 n.3 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]

1994, writ denied) (noting that under the wrongful death statute, the statute of limitations is tolled for minors); Texas Utils. Co. v. West, 59 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding a minor may bring a wrongful death
action even if the surviving parent's claim is time-barred).
99. See Texas Utils. Co. v. West, 59 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (Tex. App.-Amarillo

1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996). See also
Shidaker v. Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied)

(holding "when an action is founded on a health care liability claim of misdiagnosis or
mistreatment, the operative limitations period for redress is the one specified by the
Medical Liability Act, irrespective of the alleged extent of the health care injury").

101. See Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Kimball v. Brothers,
741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1988); Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. App.Tlyler 1995, no writ).
102. See TEX. REV. CIv.

STAT.

ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).

103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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notwithstanding any other law.'" Nevertheless, plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent the MLIIA's strict damages cap and limitations
provision, arguing the MLIIA does not control death claims." 7
Rather, plaintiffs advocate the more
liberal Wrongful Death Act ap08
plies to all death causes of action.1
In the seminal case of Rose v. Doctors Hospital,'" the Texas
Supreme Court addressed whether the MLIIA's damages cap was unconstitutional as applied to a plaintiff asserting a wrongful death
claim. 110 In Rose, the decedent's widow and parents filed a wrongful
death action against a hospital after the decedent received a fatal dose
of morphine."' At trial, the jury returned a damages award exceeding the MLIIA's damages cap. 12 The trial judge entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which the court of appeals reversed, rendering judgment for the plaintiffs, subject to remitturs." 3 The plaintiffs challenged the MLIIA damages cap was unconstitutional, alleging
it violated the open courts and equal protection provisions of the
Texas Constitution. 1 4 The Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected
both constitutional challenges, holding that the Texas Legislature was
within its power to limit damage awards for statutory causes of
action."15
In Bala v. Maxwell," 6 the Texas Supreme Court held the MLIIA
limitations provision, not the Wrongful Death Act limitations provision, applies to medical wrongful death claims." 7 In Bala, a patient
106. See Johnson v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1996); Baptist Mem'l
Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Bala v. Maxwell,
909 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
107. See, e.g., Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1995), rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam); Bala, 909 S.W.2d at 891-92.
108. See, e.g., Bala, 909 S.W.2d at 891-92.
109. 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).
110. See id. at 842.
111. See id. at 843.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 843, 845.
115. See id. at 845-46.
116. 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995).
117. See id. at 893. Prior to the court's holding in Bala, Texas courts of appeals
were not uniformly holding that the MLIIA limitations period applied to death
claims caused by medical malpractice. For example, in Rascoe v. Anabtawi, 730
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ), a plaintiff with a medical death
claim argued that a tolling provision of the Wrongful Death Act conferred upon him a
twelve-month extension and that the MLIIA's statute of limitations did not control
his claim. See id. at 461 (citing TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5538 [current version
at TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.062 (West 1986)]). The tolling statute,
art. 5538, provided:
In case of the death of any person against whom or in whose favor there may
be a cause of action, the law of limitation shall cease to run against such
cause of action until twelve months after such death, unless an administrator
or executor shall have sooner qualified according to law upon such deceased
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person's estate; in which case the law of limitation shall cease to run until
such qualification.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.art. 5538 [current version at TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.062 (West 1986)]. The Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs argument, holding the general tolling provision was inapplicable and that
the MLIIA's limitation provision was peremptory and controlling. See Rascoe, 730
S.W.2d at 461. The Rascoe court relied on Hill v. Milani, 686 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1985),
a Texas Supreme Court decision holding that a general tolling provision, operating to
suspend the running of limitations when a person is out of the state, did not apply to
toll limitations in medical malpractice cases because it was part of the other law preempted by the MLIIA. See Rascoe, 730 S.W.2d at 461 (citing Hill, 686 S.W.2d at 61011 and TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5537 (Vernon 1958) [current version at TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.063 (Vernon 1986)]). Therefore, the Rascoe
court, following Hill, stated, "[The Hill court] emphatically approved only those provisions of the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act specifically tolling limitations, and held that Article 5537 was not part of the statutory scheme but was part of
the 'other law.' Certainly this would apply as well to Article 5538." Rascoe, 730
S.W.2d at 461. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. AN.art. 5537 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 16.063 (Vernon 1986)). Consequently,
the Rascoe court held article 5538 was also part of the other law expressly preempted
by the MLIIA and did not apply to medical wrongful death claims. See Rascoe, 730
S.W.2d at 461.
Similarly, in Sanchez v. Memorial Medical Center Hospital, 769 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ), the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held the
MLIIA's statute of limitations controls medical death claims and confers only two
years from the last date of treatment to file health care liability claims, despite the
appellants' assertion that the Wrongful Death Act applied and conferred an additional twelve months following death to fie a claim. See Sanchez, 769 S.W.2d at 65960. The Sanchez court explained:
We disagree with appellants' arguments and hold that sections 16.003 and
16.062 do not act to invalidate the absolute two-year limitations period contained within article 4590i, section 10.01 [MLIIA limitations provision]....
We believe the language of this statute to be clear and exclusive. The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act contains limited tolling provisions, suspending the two-year limitations statute during minority, s 10.01,
and upon the giving of notice, s 4.01(a).
Id. at 660. See also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 16.062(a) (Vernon 1986).
Section 16.062 provides: "The death of a person against whom or in whose favor
there may be a cause of action suspends the running of an applicable statute of limitations for 12 months after the death." Id. The Sanchez court concluded that unless an
exception specifically delineated within the MLIIA applied, such as the giving of notice or minority, then, the MLIIA's general two-year limitations period controls. See
Sanchez, 769 S.W.2d at 660.
In Shidaker v. Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied),
the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the MLIIA's limitations period controls
"[n]otwithstanding any other law" and that the limitations provision of the Wrongful
Death Act was part of the "other law" expressly made inapplicable by the MLIIA.
Id. at 943. Rejecting the appellant's contention that the Wrongful Death Act's limitations period controlled and thus the statute of limitations commenced on his death
claim upon the date of death, the Shidaker court reasoned:
[T]o follow the Shidakers' rationale to its logical conclusion would nullify
the period of limitations for a health care liability claim of misdiagnosis or
mistreatment by extending it indefinitely until the patient died and for two
years thereafter. This result would be the antithesis of the legislative purpose in enacting the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act to
alleviate a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, a part of which
was the adoption of the absolute two-year limitations period.
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was hospitalized for anemia 18 when an esophagogastroduodenoscopy
("EGD") revealed a lesion in his stomach. 9 A cell biopsy indicated
the lesion was probably benign, but failed to foreclose the possibility
the cells were malignant. 120 Subsequent cell stains also indicated the
tumor was benign. 21 However, during a follow-up visit occurring
over a year later, another EGD revealed the stomach lesion was ulcerated. 12 2 A new cell biopsy indicated the presence of malignant
cells. 2 3 Further tests revealed cancer in the stomach and lungs. 24
After treatment failed to save the patient's life, the family filed a
wrongful death suit within two years of his death, alleging
the initial
25
cancer.
the
diagnose
to
failed
negligently
physician
Reversing the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals' holding that the plaintiffs timely filed suit under the two-year limitations
Id. Following the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Hill, 686 S.W.2d at 611-13, the
Shidaker court applied the MLIIA's limitations period to medical death claims, holding the MLIIA controls all actions based on medical malpractice regardless of the
extent of a patient's injuries. See Shidaker, 805 S.W.2d at 943.
In contrast, in Wilson v. Rudd, 814 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied), overruled by Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1995) (per
curiam), the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals refused to bar a medical
death action after recognizing that the claim was filed over two years after the occurrence of the underlying medical tort and in spite of the fact that under Hill, Shidaker,
and Sanchez, the claim would be barred. See id. at 822-23. Instead, the court held the
Wrongful Death Act's limitations provision was not part of the "other law" expressly
preempted by the MLIIA. See id. at 822. Rather, the Wilson court held the Wrongful
Death Act applies to all death claims. See id. The Wilson court refused to distinguish
medical wrongful death plaintiffs from nonmedical wrongful death plaintiffs, reasoning that the plain language of the Wrongful Death Act illustrated a legislative intent
that wrongful death plaintiffs should receive two years from the date of death to institute suit. See id. at 822-23. However, the court did attempt to harmonize the limitations periods of both statutes, holding that limitations commence upon the date of
death, pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, but that a plaintiff then has two years to
institute suit, pursuant to the MLIIA. See id.
Subsequent courts faced with the same issue have refused to follow Wilson and
have instead applied the MLIIA's limitations provision to medical death claims. For
example, in Blackmon v. Hollimon, 847 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992,
writ denied), the San Antonio Court of Appeals specifically rejected Wilson and
noted the Wilson court's refusal to follow Shidaker and Sanchez. See id. at 616-17.
The Blackmon court held the plaintiff's medical death claim was time-barred because
he failed to institute suit within two years of the occurrence of the defendant's negligence, as required by the MLIIA. See id. at 617. Likewise, in Todd v. Planned
Parenthood,853 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied), the Dallas Court
of Appeals barred a plaintiff's death claim because he failed to file suit within two
years of the occurrence of the medical tort, concluding that the clear language of the
MLIIA indicates it controls all medical claims. See id. at 127-28.
118. See Bala, 909 S.W.2d at 890.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

25

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

148

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

provision of the Wrongful Death Act,12 6 the Texas Supreme Court
explained,
Generally, wrongful death claims are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins on the date of death. However, when a
wrongful death action is based on medical negligence, the medical
malpractice limitations statute, Article 4590i, section 10.01 conflicts
with section 16.003 [Wrongful Death Act limitation provision]. Section 10.01 provides that health care liability
claims must be filed
1 27
within two years of the alleged breach.

Pursuant to the plain language of the MLIIA, the court held plaintiffs
asserting medical wrongful death claims have two years from the occurrence of a defendant's malpractice to file suit and not two years
from the date of death.' 28 The Bala court reasoned the language of
the MLIIA clearly illustrated a legislative intent for the MLIIA to
exclusively control medical negligence claims. 29 Thus, Texas courts
generally apply the MLIIA and its stringent provisions to wrongful
death causes of action premised on medical malpractice despite the
harsh outcomes inconsistent with the goals of the Wrongful Death
Act.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON MLIIA PERSONAL INJURY
CAUSES OF ACMION

Notwithstanding the MLIIA's stated goals of lowering medical malpractice insurance rates and increasing public access to health care,
the Act has been challenged and criticized from its inception. 30 Not
surprisingly, cases have arisen where courts are unwilling to bar plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims. Typically, such cases involve either a
nondiscoverable injury, or an incapacity to institute timely suit.' 3' Ju126. See id. at 891-93.

127. Id. (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.

CODE

§

16.003(b) (Vernon 1986) and TEX.

REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996)) (citations omitted).
128. See id. at 892-93.
129. See id.
130. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Wheat v. United
States, 860 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D.
Tex. 1986); Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ).
131. See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. 1995); Felan v. Ramos, 857
S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied). Notably, the discovery rule and special disability provisions for minors were alleged to be contributing to
the rise in insurance rates because the longer the statute of limitations period, the
longer the period of risk for insurers. See Redish, supra note 5, at 765. One commentator explained the relationship between malpractice insurance rates, statutes of limitations, the discovery rule, and the disability of minors, stating:
The rate-setting problem is further aggravated by two related doctrines employed by certain states: the discovery rule and special disability provisions
for minors. The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until the victim discovers or should have discovered his
injury, rather than from the time the injury was inflicted. The purpose of the
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dicial justifications for refusing to permit limitations to bar plaintiffs'
claims include fraudulent concealment, 3 2 impossibility of discovery, 33 a continuing treatment,'3 disability, 35 and constitutional rediscovery rule is to prevent the statute of limitations from depriving injured
patients of their causes of action before the harmful effects arising from
treatment become manifest. Although the discovery rule prevents unfair
procedural denial of malpractice claims, it is inconsistent with the policies
that the statute of limitations is designed to foster-repose and the avoidance of stale claims-and thus may impose severe hardship on the health
care provider.
The special disability period for minors is also intended to prevent the
unfair loss of claims. Under this practice a minor is considered disabled,
tolling the statute of limitations, until he reaches the age of majority, apparently on the theory that until that time there is no assurance that the child's
interests will be protected. Because of this rule, however, injured young
children retain viable claims for periods of time greatly in excess of the traditional limitations period. The extended period of liability exposure resulting
from application of the discovery rule and special disability provision has
prompted passage of statutes of limitation that reject or modify these
doctrines.
Id. at 765-66 (citations omitted).
132. See Thames v. Dennison, 821 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (recognizing the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment estops a medical
malpractice defendant from claiming the statutes of limitations affirmative defense);
Warner v. Sunkavalli, 795 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, no writ) (holding
the limitation period contained in the MLIIA does not invalidate the effect of equitable estoppel, such that fraudulent concealment may defeat an affirmative defense of
limitations); Borderlawn v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983) (holding the two-year
limitations period contained in the MLIIA does not abolish the use of fraudulent
concealment to defeat the affirmative defense of limitations); Weaver v. Witt, 552
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1977) (holding plaintiffs can plead the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to avoid the affirmative defense of limitations and to avoid summary judgment); Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe, 553 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding public policy dictates permitting the equitable doctrine of fraudulent
concealment to avoid a statute of limitations defense in a medical malpractice action
because it would be unjust to allow wrongdoers to benefit from their actions by barring injured plaintiffs' claims).
133. See Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (holding statutes of limitation
restricting a plaintiff's right of redress for a sponge left in his abdomen was unconstitutional as violative of the open courts provision); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. 1984) (holding the two-year statute of limitations applied to medical actions
violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution by cutting off a cause of
action before the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that he is injured);
Tsai v. Wells, 725 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding application of two-year statute of limitation contained in the MLIIA violated
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution when the patient lacked a reasonable opportunity to discover the medical malpractice within the allotted time period);
Melendez v. Beal, 683 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ)
(holding the MLIIA does not abrogate the discovery rule where the absolute twoyear limitation period would be unreasonable, absurd and unjust as in cases where the
patient could not know or reasonably know of the medical negligence before limitations run); Newberry v. Tarvin, 594 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
no writ) (holding a patient's cause of action accrues against a medical defendant when
the patient discovers or reasonably should discover an injury, rather than on the date
of the alleged wrongful act). Contra Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1985)

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

27

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

150

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

quirements. 136 Thus, in some cases, courts hold plaintiffs' rights to
for injuries outweigh the need
institute suits to obtain compensation
137
to lower medical insurance rates.
(holding failure to file a medical malpractice claim within the two-year limitations
period contained within the MLIIA barred recovery as the legislature intended to
abolish the discovery rule when it eliminated the word "accrued" from the language
of the statute); Lamar v. Graham, 639 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1982) (holding a plaintiff
filing a malpractice suit for negligent diagnosis was time-barred because his cause of
action accrued at the time of the alleged misdiagnosis and the plaintiff failed to file a
claim within two years of the diagnosis); Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.
1977) (holding a plaintiff filing a malpractice suit for negligent diagnosis was timebarred by the MLIIA two-year statute of limitations because the discovery rule did
not apply to misdiagnosis claims); Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen. Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 162
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (holding the discovery rule, operating
to commence limitations on the date the patient discovers or reasonably should discover his injury, rather than the date the alleged tort occurred, is not applicable in
cases governed by the MLIIA).
134. See Desiga v. Scheffey, 874 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ) (holding the continuous treatment exception whereby limitations commence
on the last date of treatment, is only used when no other ascertainable date exists to
determine precisely when the tort occurs); Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156
(Tex. 1993) (holding follow-up treatment constitutes continuing treatment).
135. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding the MLIIA's statute of limitation
period requiring a minor to file suit for medical negligence while still under the legal
disability of minority is unconstitutional because it impermissively cuts off the minor's
cause of action before he could sue on his own behalf); Felan v. Ramos, 857 S.W.2d
113 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding the two-year statute of
limitation period contained in the MLIIA violates the open courts provision of the
Texas Constitution when applied to a mental incompetent's common law personal
injury action).
136. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding the MLIIA violated the open courts
provision by prematurely cutting off a minor's cause of action); Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at
923 (holding the two-year statute of limitations contained in the MLIIA violated the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution because it cut off the plaintiff's cause
of action before he knew or could reasonably have known he was injured); Sax v.
Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (holding the medical liability act's two-year statute of limitation provision that barred a minor's claim after he reached age six violated the due process guarantee of the Texas Constitution because it eliminated a
minor's right to bring a common law cause of action, yet failed to provide a substitute
remedy).
137. See Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the
MLIIA's damages provision violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (holding the MLIIA
damages cap, limiting the recovery of deserving victims of malpractice, violates the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution and the equal protection clauses of
both the Texas and United States Constitutions as the restriction on the right of redress for common law tort actions was unreasonable and arbitrary when balanced
against the purpose of the classification); Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding the
MLIIA's limitations period unduly restricts minors' rights to file common law claims
for medical malpractice); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (holding
the statutory limitation on medical malpractice damages violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (holding the MLIIA violated
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution as applied to minors) , Detar
Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)
(holding the MLIIA damages cap unreasonably and arbitrarily restricts a plaintiffs
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A. Reducing the Size of Damage Awards: The Damages Cap
Federal and state courts hold the MLIIA damages cap is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs instituting personal injury suits. For example, in Waggoner v. Gibson, 38 the United States District Court
held the MLIIA damages cap violated the equal protection provisions
of both the United States and Texas Constitutions, as applied to a patient who became completely disabled, suffering severe and irreversible brain damage during a routine medical operation. 139 The court
found the legislative goals supporting the cap were not legitimate and
held the cap was invalid because it discriminated between classes of
tort victims and between seriously injured and non-seriously injured
classes of victims.' 40 The court also held the cap violated the open
courts provision of the Texas Constitution because it displaced victims' common law causes of action yet failed to provide an adequate
substitute remedy.' 4 ' Furthermore, after noting that much debate existed as to whether a medical malpractice insurance crisis actually existed in Texas, 142 the court stated, "Even assuming that such a 'crisis'
has a basis in fact, it is indisputable that constitutional protections
are
43
not suspended in time of even the most legitimate crises.'
In Lucas v. United States,'" the Texas Supreme Court held the
MLIIA damages cap violated the open courts provision of the Texas
Constitution because the restriction on victims' recoveries was unreasonable and arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of
the statute. 45 In Lucas, a fourteen-month-old child became permanently paralyzed after a hospital nurse negligently injected penicillin
directly into an artery. 146 The court refused to enforce the MLIIA
damages cap, finding the Act fails to assure a rational relationship exists between actual damages and amounts awarded because the cap
applies to all claimants without regard to the severity of their injuconstitutional right to redress in the courts for injuries due to another's wrongful
conduct).
138. 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
139. See id. at 1104, 1107.
140. See id., at 1106-07 & n.8.
141. See id. at 1108.
142. See id. at 1104. The court stated, "one of the legal profession's foremost empirical analysts has concluded that the entire 'litigation explosion' that has precipitated 'tort reform' measures (like the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act of Texas) is nonexistent." Id. at 1104 n.2 (citing Marc S. Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4
(1983)).
143. Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1107 (citations omitted).
144. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988). Lucas was brought in federal court and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Texas Supreme Court the question of
whether the statutory limitation on medical malpractice damages violated the Texas
Constitution. See Lucas v. United States, 811 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1987).
145. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690.
146. See id. at 688.
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ries. 147 The court explained: "In the context of persons catastrophically injured by medical negligence, we believe it is unreasonable and
arbitrary to limit their recovery in a speculative [legislative] experi'1 48
ment to determine whether liability insurance rates will decrease.'
In Wheat v. United States,149 the Fifth Circuit followed the Lucas
decision, and held the MLIIA's damages cap violated the open courts
provision of the Texas Constitution as applied to common law personal injury claims.' 50 In Wheat, a patient's family brought a medical
malpractice action against the United States and a private physician
after the patient's cervical cancer remained undiagnosed and untreated for a four-year period, leading to her death. 511 The Wheat
court upheld the lower court's damages award to the decedent's estate, even though it exceeded the MLIIA damages cap. 15 Furthermore, the Wheat court upheld the one million dollar award to the
decedent's minor daughter for loss of care, maintenance, support,
services, education, advise, counsel, love, companionship, pecuniary
support and mental anguish, finding the award was not disproportionate to the deprivation the child suffered. 153 Following these landmark
judicial decisions, plaintiffs injured by medical malpractice may receive compensation proportional to their injuries.
B. Reducing the Number of Damage Awards: The Limitations
Provision
MLIIA legislators, in an effort to lower the number of medical malpractice claims, implemented an absolute two-year limitations period
and abolished the discovery rule. 54 The MLIIA limitations period
commences at the time the medical tort occurs. 155 However, if that
date is not ascertainable, limitations commence on the last date of
147. See id. at 690-91.
148. Id. at 691. The court found the damages cap particularly offensive in light of

the fact that "Even the Keeton Commission could not conclude there was any correlation between a damage cap and the stated purpose of improved health care, stating

that adequate data was lacking." Id. (citing Keeton Report at 7). Furthermore, the
Lucas court noted that the Texas Legislature choose not to follow Dean Keeton's
recommendation that a victim's compensation fund be adopted as a statutory substitute for limitations on medical victims' recoveries. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY
COMMISSION TO THE 65TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE,

December 1976 at 51-52). More-

over, the Lucas court questioned "whether the drafters of the Texas Constitution intended for the legislature to enact special laws for the protection of specified classes
of tortfeasors." Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 689 n.1.
149. 860 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1988).

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 1259.
See id. at 1257-58.
See id. at 1262.
See id.
See TEX. REv. CIv.

STAT.

ANN.art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996); Kimball

v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987).

155. See Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372.
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treatment or hospitalization. 156 Therefore, if a plaintiff fails to institute a claim against a health care provider within two years of either
the occurrence of the tort, the last date of treatment, or the last date
of hospitalization, his claim is barred. 1 57 However, Texas courts have
held the MLIIA statute of limitations period is unconstitutional when
it cuts off an injured person's5 8right to sue before he has a reasonable
opportunity to institute suit.'
For instance, in Nelson v. Krusen, 59 the court permitted the parents
of a child born with muscular dystrophy to recover damages from a
physician and a hospital for wrongful birth, after the physician failed
to advise them the mother was a carrier of the genetic disease.' 60 The
court held the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Medical
Act violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, as it
applied to the parent's claim, because the symptoms of muscular dystrophy do not become apparent until several years after birth.' 61 Consequently, the court found it impossible to discover the child had
inherited the disease or the cause of action until after the two-year
limitations period expired.' 6 The court thus found the time limitation
was unconstitutional because it prematurely cut off the parents' right
to file a claim and failed to provide them with an alternative remedy.' 63 The Nelson court found the Act required the plaintiffs "to do
156. See id.; Adkins v. Tafel, 871 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no
writ).
157. See Rivera v. Mitchell, 764 S.W.2d 393, 394-95 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no
writ) (barring a patient's medical malpractice claim because he failed to file his lawsuit within the time required).
158. See Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (holding the MLIIA's two
year statute of limitations is unconstitutional under the open courts provision when it
cuts off an injured person's right to bring suit before he has a reasonable opportunity
to discover the wrong); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (holding statutes of limitations that cut off a plaintiff's cause of action before he has a reasonable
opportunity to discover the wrong and bring suit violates the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution); Legesse v. Primacare, 899 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1995, writ denied) (stating the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution protects plaintiffs from the two-year limitations period that would cut off their right to
sue before they have a reasonable opportunity to discover their injuries); Deluna v.
Rizkallah, 754 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied)
("The constitutionality of article 4590i has been upheld so long as the statute does not
cut off the cause of action before the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover
the wrong and bring suit within the two-year period."); Tsai v. Wells, 725 S.W.2d 271
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding the open courts provision
prevents a patient's cause of action from being barred when she did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong within the absolute two-year limitation
period).
159. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
160. See id. at 919.
161. See id. at 919, 922, 925. Although the Nelson court specifically held that article
5.82, § 4 of the Texas Insurance Code was unconstitutional, essentially the same provision was enacted in the MLIIA. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 920 n.1.
162. See id. at 923.
163. See id.
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the impossible-to sue before they had any reason to know they
should sue."'" The court concluded "Such a result is rightly described as 'shocking' and is so absurd and so unjust that it ought not
be possible."' 65
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court and a court of appeals have
held that the limitations provision contained in the Medical Liability
Act violated the open courts and due process provisions of the Texas
Constitution because the provision unduly restricted minors' rights to
obtain compensation for medical injuries. 166 In Sax v. Votteler,167 the
Texas Supreme Court first addressed whether the limitations period in
the Medical Liability Act and its minority tolling provision, requiring
minors to file personal injury claims by age eight, was unconstitutional. 168 In Sax, the parents of a minor brought suit against a physician for mistakenly removing one of the minor's fallopian tubes
instead of her appendix.' 69 Because the suit was brought when the
minor was fourteen-years old, and three years after the defendant
the physician argued the claim was barred by
committed malpractice,
70
limitations.'
The Sax court, however, unanimously held that barring a minor's
claim at age eight violated the open courts and due process provisions
of the Texas Constitution. 171 The court concluded the limitations provision unreasonably restricted the minor's cause of action, because it
cut off that cause of action before the minor was legally able to assert
it, without providing an adequate substitute remedy. 72 The court explained: "the right to bring a well-established common law cause of
action cannot be effectively abrogated by the legislature absent a
showing that the legislative basis for the statute outweighs the denial
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 318-19 (Tex. 1995); Nelson, 678 S.W.2d
at 922-23; Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Battaile v. Yoffe, 882 S.W.2d 13
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
167. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
168. See id. at 663. Specifically, Sax held that article 5.82, § 4 of the Texas Insurance Code was unconstitutional. See id. at 667. Notably, the minority tolling provision contained in the Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals Act, codified in the Texas
Insurance Code, required minors to institute suit by age eight. See id. at 663. Article

5.82, § 4 stated, "[M]inors under the age of six years shall have until their eighth

birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, such claim." TEX. INS. CODE
Arm. art. 5.82, § 4 (Vernon 1976) (current version at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.

4590i, § 10.01). However, following the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Sax, the
Texas Legislature enacted the MLIIA and its minority tolling provision that requires
minors to institute suit by age fourteen. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 663 n.1; TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
169. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 662.

170. See id.
171. See id. at 667 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13).
172. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667.
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of the constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress."' 73
Finding it unreasonable either to assume parents will always protect
minors' rights or to bar minors' remedies if parents fail to enforce
minors' rights before limitations run, the Sax court found the legislative means employed to limit the number of malpractice claims was
unreasonable when weighed against the abrogation of a child's right
to obtain a remedy. 174 Thus, the court refused to bar the minor's
cause of action while she remained under a disability.' 75
Similarly, in Battaile v. Yoffe,' 76 a mother sued a physician on behalf
of her minor daughter, alleging the physician failed to properly diagnose and treat her daughter for apnea (abnormal cessation of breathing during sleep) during the first three days after birth. 7 7 The suit
was filed when the daughter was fifteen-years old. 1 78 However, the
physician argued that the MLIIA required that suit be brought within
two years of the tort's occurrence or by the time a minor reaches age
fourteen. 179 The lower court agreed, holding that8 0 under the plain
wording of the Act, the minor's claim was barred.1
The appellate court reversed, finding the limitation period unreasonably restricted the minor's common law cause of action, impermissively cut off her right to file a claim before she was legally capable of
asserting it, and failed to offer her an alternative remedy.' 8 ' Thereviofore, as applied to the minor's claim, the court held the statute
1 82
Constitution.
Texas
the
of
provision
courts
open
lated the
More recently, in Weiner v. Wasson, s3 the Texas Supreme Court
again held the limitations provision contained in the MLIIA was unconstitutional as applied to minors." 4 In Weiner, a fifteen-year old
minor underwent surgery to have a surgical pin implanted into the
femur of his right leg.'8 5 After the minor continued to incur problems,
another physician discovered the surgical pin implant was impermissively protruding into the hip joint.'8 6 The minor underwent numerous surgeries including a total hip replacement to repair the damage
173. See id. at 665-66. See also Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1977);
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. 1955); Hanks v. City of Port
Authur, 48 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1932).
174. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665-67.
175. See id. at 667. Notably, the court upheld the bar on the parent's claim for
medical costs, holding that the child's disability, and therefore the minority tolling
benefit, did not extend to their claim. See id.
176. 882 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
177. See id. at 14.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 16.
182. See id.
183. 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
184. See id. at 317.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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caused by the protruding pin.' 87 The minor filed a malpractice suit
against the original
treating physician four years after the surgical pin
8
was implanted.1
The Weiner court held the MLIIA limitations period and its revised
minority tolling provision, requiring a minor to institute suit by his
fourteenth birthday, 8 9 violated the open courts provision of the Texas
Constitution by impermissibly cutting off his cause of action. 19° Following Sax, the Weiner court struck down the age restrictions and held
that a minor, whose medical malpractice action accrues while he is still
a minor, has until his twentieth birthday to bring suit against a
physician.' 9'
In sum, the Texas Supreme Court holds the MLIIA may not cut off
an injured person's right to sue before he has a reasonable opportunity to institute suit. The court thus .refuses to permit the MLIIA to
prematurely cut off minors' causes of action. 92 Pursuant to the
Supreme Court's holding in Weiner, minors injured by medical malpractice who assert personal injury claims may toll limitations until
they reach age eighteen and have until their twentieth birthdays to
institute suit.
The holdings of the Nelson, Sax, Battaile and Weiner courts is congruous with the holding of Rose. Although the Rose court held the
legislature may constitutionally limit damage awards for statutory
causes of action, it conceded the same provision could be held unconstitutional as applied to common law causes of action. 193 Not surprisingly, however, plaintiffs with statutory wrongful death claims, as well
as plaintiffs with common law personal injury claims, have challenged
the MLIIA is unconstitutional, asserting it violates the open courts
provision, 94 due process provision, 95 equal protection provision, 196
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
190. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19.
191. See id. at 321. The Weiner court, in determining the limitations period that
should apply to minors filing personal injury claims, chose to look to the general limitations period enacted by the legislature in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code in sections 16.001 and 16.003, which exclude the time a person is under a disability from the limitations period. See id.
192. The Texas Supreme Court has held unconstitutional several limitations provisions contained in medical liability acts as unduly restrictive of a minor's right to file a
common law personal injury claim. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-19; Sax v. Votteler,
648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
193. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1990).
194. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam); Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 317; Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845; Morrison v. Chan, 699
S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1985); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Winkle v. Tulos,
917 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Burgess
v. Jennings, 903 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ); Weatherby v. Scenic
Mountain Med. Ctr., 896 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied); Holt v.
Epley, 894 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied); Hogan v. Hallman,

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I1.5

34

McLeod Hamrick: The MLIIA: Bad Medicine and Bad Law Is a Costly Combination for T

1996]

THE MLIIA

157

889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Palla v. McDonald, 877 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Todd v. Planned
Parenthood, 853 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied); Liggett v.
Blocher, 849 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Wilson v.
Rudd, 814 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Work v.
Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Shidaker v.
Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied); Tinkle v. Henderson, 730 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ refused); Melendez v. Beal, 683
S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution [Texas open courts provision] provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. The open courts provision "guarantees that 'the
right to bring a well-established common law cause of action cannot be effectively
abrogated by the legislature absent a showing that the legislative basis for the statute
outweighs the denial of the constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress."' Weiner,
900 S.W.2d at 318 (quoting Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665-66). The open courts provision
provides two distinct guarantees: that courts shall be open and that persons shall have
remedies by due course of law. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 696 (Tex.
1988). The due process guarantee of the open courts provision ensures that citizens
bringing common law claims will not unreasonably be denied access to the courts. See
Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665. Pursuant to the open courts provision, several cases have
established an open courts defense to the application of the MLIIA limitations defense. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318; Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667. In sum, "the party
seeking to rely on the [MLIIA] limitations statute must negate the open courts defense." Holt, 894 S.W.2d at 516.
195. See Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995),
rev'd sub. nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Hogan v. Halman,
889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
Article I § 19 of the Texas Constitution [due process provision] provides: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities,
or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land."
TEx. CONST. art. I, § 19. In assessing due process challenges, courts balance the public's gain resulting from legislation against its effect on personal and property rights.
See Arredondo, 904 S.W.2d at 760. The Arredondo court stated: "A law is unconstitutional as violating due process [only] when it is arbitrary or unreasonable, and the
latter occurs when the social necessity the law is meant to serve is not a sufficient
justification of the restriction or the liberty or rights involved." See id. (quoting
Pedraza v. Tibbs, 826 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ
dism'd w.o.j.)).
Due process requires that a limitations period be of adequate length to permit a party to enforce his rights. When the party has free access to the
courts for a period of time sufficient for an ordinarily diligent person to commence legal proceedings to protect his rights, the limitations period is reasonable and adequate.
Id. (citing Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 918 (Tex. 1984)).
196. See Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Rose v. Doctors
Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995,
writ denied); Povolish v. Bethania Reg'l Health Care Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen. Hosp., 664
S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ); Neagle v. Nelson, 658
S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 685 S.W.2d 11
(Tex. 1985).
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and constitutes special legislation granting privileges and immunities
to a particular class of defendants. 197 However, despite successful
constitutional attacks, the MLIIA's severability clause permits specific
provisions or198
applications of the Act to be annulled while the statute
remains law.

Nevertheless, the precise constitutional boundaries of a twentyyear-old statute have yet to be completely prescribed by the Texas
Supreme Court. What is clear from the court's decisions, however, is
that the MLIIA may not constitutionally place unreasonable time restrictions on plaintiffs asserting common law causes of action. Specifically, the MLIIA may not constitutionally place unreasonable
restrictions on minors filing personal injury actions. What remains unclear is whether the court will hold the same MLIIA time restriction is
constitutionally permissible as applied to minors asserting statutory
wrongful death causes of action.
IV. MEDICAL WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSES OF ACTION AND
MINORITY TOLLING PROVISIONS

Virtually all states enacted medical statutes to combat the perceived
national' 99 medical liability insurance crisis. 200 These statutes generally include strict limitations provisions. 20 1 However, some states perArticle I, § 3 of the Texas Constitution [equal protection provision] provides: "All
free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of
men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
197. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 700; Neagle, 658 S.W.2d at 260; Phillips,664 S.W.2d
at 168-69.
198. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 844. The MLIIA's severability clause "states in part
that if the application of the statute to any person or circumstance is held unconstitutional, then the effect of the invalidation shall be confined to the portion of the statute
adjudged to be unconstitutional." Id.
199. Many commentators disputed whether a nationalcrisis ever really existed. For
instance, James Posner noted, "In the aggregate, even after adding an increment for
self-insurance's contribution, malpractice costs are not a major cost factor for most
hospitals, or even for many doctors." See Posner, supra note 42, at 49; supra notes 42,
63.
200. See Smith, supra note 57, at 221-22.
201. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-682 (West 1996); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.010 (Michie
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-561 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203
(Michie 1995); CAL. CODE CIV. PRAC. § 340.5 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-80-102.5 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (West 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-71 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ArN. § 657-7.3 (Michie 1996); IDAHO
CODE § 5-219 (West 1996); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212 (West 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-12-7-1 (West 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West 1996); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (West 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(e) (Banks-Baldwin
1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5628 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ArN. tit. 24, ch. 21,
§ 2902 (West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE § 5-109, 5-201 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 260, § 4 (West 1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (West 1996); MiNN.
STAT. ANrN. § 541.07 (1) (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (West 1996); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 561.1051 (West 1996); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-2-205 (West 1995); NEB.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I1.5

36

McLeod Hamrick: The MLIIA: Bad Medicine and Bad Law Is a Costly Combination for T

1996]

THE MLIIA

mit minors asserting medical wrongful death claims to toll limitations
until they reach majority.2" 2 Further, in some jurisdictions, limitations
commence on medical wrongful death claims upon death 20 3 and death
actions are not considered derivative claims.20 4 In contrast, death
claims are considered derivative actions in Texas and medical death
claims fall under the MLIIA. The Act has a two-year statute of limitations commencing when the defendant commits a tort and the Act
only preserves minors' claims until they reach age fourteen.20 5 Not
surprisingly, the interaction of these factors have caused issues to
arise regarding when minors' medical death claims become timeREV. STAT. § 25-208 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.097 (West 1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:4 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:14-2.1, 2A:14-2.2 (West
1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Michie 1996); N.Y. INS. LAW § 214-a (McKinney
1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-17, 90-21.11 (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-18,
28-01-25 (West 1995); OHIO REV. STAT. § 2305.11 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (West 1995); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.605 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (West 1996); S.C.
CODE Ar. § 15-3-545 (Law. Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-14.1 (Michie
1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (West 1996); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4590i
(West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. § 521 (West
1996); VA. CODE Arm. 1950 § 8.01-243.1 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.350 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (West 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55
(West 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-107 (Michie 1996).

202. See Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 841-42 (La. 1993) (holding a minor's
wrongful death action fell outside the prescriptive limitations period of the medical
act); Moncor Trust Co. ex rel. Flynn v. Feil, 733 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding the limitations statute contained in the medical act inapplicable to minor
wrongful death beneficiaries); Dachs v. Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp., 509 N.E.2d 489,
491-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that "Illinois public policy favors protecting minors and refuses to bar claims by minors not timely pursued by their personal representatives," and that limitations of the medical malpractice statute are tolled during
minority, thus, medical malpractice wrongful death claims of deceased patient's minor
children are tolled during their minority); Kohrt v. Yetter, 344 N.W.2d 245, 246-48
(Iowa 1984) (holding the minority tolling provision operated to extend limitations on
death actions until one year after a minor attains majority). See also Smith, supra
note 57, at 221-22.
203. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-562 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603401 (West 1995).
204. There are two lines of authority on whether a wrongful death action is genuinely derivative, or whether it must merely be based on an actionable wrong. See
Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 795 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]

1990), affd, 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992). Some states regard the wrongful death suit
as derivative. See id. Those states construe the clause if death had not ensued or if he
had lived, as rendering a death action genuinely derivative. See id. If the statute of
limitation runs against the decedent at the time of his death, those states hold that
beneficiaries may not bring a suit for wrongful death. See id. Other states regard the
wrongful death suit as a new and independent cause of action. See id. They interpret
the clause if death had not ensued as requiring simply an actionable tort as the under-

lying basis for the suit. See id. Thus, under these states' interpretation, even if the
statute of limitations has run on a decedent's personal injury claim against the decedent at the time of his death, a cause of action for wrongful death will not be barred.
See id. See generally F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 24.1 (2d ed. 1986).

205. See, e.g., Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 345-48; Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam).
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barred and whether adults may use a decedent child's disability status
to obtain additional time to file medical death claims.
A.

Texas

The MLIIA contains a two-year limitations period that generally
commences upon the date of injury.2° In addition, the statute contains a minority tolling provision whereby minors may gain additional
time to institute suit. 20 7 It provides that "minors under the age of 12
years shall have until their 14th birthday in which to file, or have filed
on their behalf, the claim. '208 When medical death claims involve minors, two situations typically arise: medical malpractice either causes
the death of a child or a child's parent.
Based on the derivative nature of a death claim and the MLIIA's
two-year limitations period, minor beneficiaries will attempt to file
medical wrongful death claims in one of three situations: (1) an adult
dies within two years of his injury without filing a personal injury
claim; (2) an adult files a personal injury claim within two years of his
injury but subsequently dies before the suit is resolved; or (3) an adult
fails to institute a personal injury suit within two years of his injury
and subsequently dies with his personal injury claim already barred by
limitations. In all three scenarios, the factors determining whether a
minor may institute a medical wrongful death suit is whether the adult
instituted suit within the limitations period, whether the adult died
within the limitations period, and whether the minor is over age fourteen. However, in all scenarios, if more than two years has passed
since the adult was injured and if a child reaches age fourteen before a
claim is filed, the minority tolling provision will not preserve the
child's wrongful death claim. Rather, the MLIIA will bar his claim
before he attains majority. Thus, if a claim is not filed on a minor's
behalf by the time he reaches age fourteen, the MLIIA, as written,
will bar his cause of action.
In contrast, when a parent loses a child and attempts to file a medical wrongful death claim, the factor determining whether he may institute suit is whether limitations have run. However, the issue of
whether the minority tolling provision confers upon adult beneficiaries additional filing time arises when the date of a child's injury
and the date of his death are not the same. Until recently, the issue of
whether an adult could toll the commencement of limitations based
on the minor's disability remained unresolved. However, the Texas
Supreme Court, in Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Arredondo, recently
held the MLIIA minority tolling provision does not apply to an adult
206. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996);
Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1987).
207. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996);
Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
208. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
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beneficiary's wrongful death claim.2 0 9 Nonetheless, the following
analysis of the minority tolling provision, as applied to adult beneficiaries' wrongful death claims, may aid in illustrating how the tolling
provision should be applied to minor beneficiaries' wrongful death
claims.
The Texas Supreme Court, in determining whether the MLIIA minority tolling provision should apply to an adult beneficiary's wrongful
death claim could have reached three possible results based upon the
derivative nature of a death claim: (1) limitations never commence on
the adult beneficiary's claim because the minor died before reaching
the age triggering the commencement of limitations; (2) limitations
commence on the adult beneficiary's wrongful death claim on the date
of the minor's death because the adult steps directly into the shoes of
the minor and the minor could have tolled limitations on his personal
injury claim until his death; or (3) limitations commence on the adult
beneficiary's wrongful death claim when the defendant commits the
act of malpractice because the disability of minority is not considered
derivative.
Under the first interpretation, both the death claim and the disability of minority could be interpreted as derivative, permitting the adult
to step into the shoes of the minor. However, under this interpretation, the parent could theoretically maintain a death action indefinitely
as limitations never commence on a child's claim because the child
never reaches the age triggering the commencement of limitations.
But, such an interpretation defeats the purposes of statutes of
limitation.21 °
Under the second interpretation, both the death claim and the disability of minority could be interpreted as derivative, but limitations
could commence on an adult's claim upon the child's death.2 ' In
other words, the child's death may be viewed as ending the disability
of minority, along with its related tolling benefit. Thus, limitations
could commence on an adult's wrongful death claim the same as they
do under the Wrongful Death Act, that is, upon death. In this case, a
claimant has two years from the date of death to institute suit under
both the Wrongful Death Act and the MLIIA. Yet, this interpretation
conflicts with the MLIIA's three-date commencement of limitations
209. 922 S.W.2d at 921.
210. Statutes of limitations are used to compel plaintiffs to enforce their rights of
action within reasonable time periods and afford "defendants a fair opportunity to
defend while witnesses are available and the circumstances are fresh in their minds."
Van De Mark et al., supra note 52, at 319 (citing Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18,
20 (Tex. 1977); Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1975); Hallaway v. Thompson, 226 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. 1950); Cox v. Rosser, 579 S.W.2d 73, 77
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
211. See Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam).
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schedule, where limitations commence upon the occurrence of the underlying medical injury.
Under the third interpretation, a death claim is derivative, but the
minority tolling provision is seen as a personal right, only belonging
to, benefitting, and claimable by a minor. Absent tolling for minority,
limitations commence on the adult's death claim on the date of injury.
Consequently, if an adult fails to institute a personal injury action on
behalf of a minor within two years of the date of injury, the adult's
death claim is barred. Alternatively, if an adult institutes a personal
injury suit on behalf of a child within two years of injury and the child
subsequently dies, the adult may tack the death claim onto the existing personal injury claim. This interpretation coincides with the
supreme court's recent decision in Baptist Memorial Hospital System,
holding an adult beneficiary's wrongful death claim was time-barred,
even though she instituted suit within two years of the child's death,
because she failed to institute suit within two years of the physician's
negligence. 1l
The confusion regarding when limitations commence on MLIIA
wrongful death actions results in large part because Texas courts apply
a Wrongful Death Act derivative rationale to death claims. The application of a derivative rationale does not present a conflict for death
claims falling under the Wrongful Death Act because limitations commence on the date of death 213 and limitations are tolled on minors'
death claims until they reach majority.2 14 However, a derivative interpretation poses problems when death claims fall under the MLIIA
because limitations commence on the date of the health care provider's negligence, 1 5 which may not be the date of death. Further,
MLIIA minors are not permitted to toll limitations until they reach
majority.2 16 As previously illustrated, if the disability of minority is
interpreted as derivative, an adult could toll the commencement of
limitations on a death claim if a minor is the decedent because the
minor could have utilized the minority tolling provision to toll the
commencement of limitations on his personal injury claim if he had
lived. Such an interpretation would enable an adult to effectively obtain two years from the date of a child's death to institute suit, thereby
circumventing the MLIIA's two-year limitations provision that commences on the occurrence of the defendant's negligence. In fact,
MLIIA adult wrongful death beneficiaries have attempted to obtain
212. 922 S.W.2d at 121-22.
213. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon 1986). "A person

must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in an
action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the
injured person." Id. § 16.003(b).
214. See Texas Utils. Co. v. West, 59 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
215. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
216. See id.
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two years from the date of a child's death to file claims by alleging
that under a derivative rationale, the minority tolling provision tolls
the commencement of limitations for the interim period between the
date of a child's injury and his death.217
In contrast, a child, legally incapable of instituting a claim until he
reaches majority, may be barred from filing a medical wrongful death
suit before he escapes disability, despite the fact that tolling provisions
are intended to preserve disabled plaintiffs' claims in the interest of
equity. Indeed, the foregoing discussion illustrating that the disability
of minority should not be interpreted as derivative serves to highlight
the true purpose of the provision-to preserve minors' claims. Yet,
the provision remains inadequate to accomplish this result. For instance, if an adult's claim is barred because he fails to file a personal
injury claim within two years of his injury and subsequently dies, then
a minor over the age of fourteen cannot utilize the minority tolling
provision to toll the commencement of limitations in order to file a
death claim because the adult's inaction bars all claims.
Not surprisingly, courts confronted with the issue of how the
MLIIA minority tolling provision applies to medical wrongful death
claims have reached conflicting results. One lower court, presented
with the question of when limitations commence on an adult's claim
for the death of a minor, applied the Wrongful Death Act's derivative
rationale, holding limitations were tolled based on the child's minority
and that limitations commenced upon the date of the child's death.21
However, the Texas Supreme Court, in Baptist Memorial Hospital System, held limitations commence on medical death claims on the date
of the occurrence of the defendant's negligence because the minority
tolling provision only benefits minors.219
Yet as previously mentioned, the minority tolling provision is inadequate because it only benefits minors if an adult institutes a suit on a
minors' behalf before the minor reaches age fourteen. Otherwise, the
MLIIA will bar his claim while he remains under a disability. To illustrate the inequity of judicial decisions addressing the interplay of medical wrongful death claims, limitations periods, and the disability of
minority, the following survey of recent case law examining adults'
and minors' medical wrongful death claims may prove helpful.

217. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 922 S.W.2d at 120-21; Cestro v. Medina, 781
S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1989, no writ); Valdez v. Texas Children's Hosp.,
673 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
218. See Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)

(per curiam).

219. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 922 S.W.2d at 121.
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1. Minors' Causes of Action
While the Texas Supreme Court holds that minors with medical personal injury claims are constitutionally guaranteed a right of redress in
the courts, and thus may toll the commencement of limitations until
they attain majority, it remains disputed whether minors with medical
wrongful death claims will be afforded the same protection. Because
the MLIIA fails to distinguish personal injury claims from death
claims, and because the Texas Supreme Court has yet to address the
issue, appellate courts have been left to dispose of the issue. While
courts generally recognize the MLIIA treats minors with medical
wrongful death claims unfairly by barring their suits while they remain
under a disability, they feel bound by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Doctors Hospital,"'° holding the legislature may constitutionally limit damage awards for statutory causes of action.
Consequently, it remains uncertain whether minors asserting medical
wrongful death actions may toll limitations until they attain majority.
In fact, lower courts hold to the contrary.
For instance, in Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc.,21 the El Paso
Court of Civil Appeals barred a nineteen year old plaintiff's suit
against a physician and hospital for causing the death of his father
when the plaintiff was age three.22 Although the court noted the
MLIIA and its limitations provision, requiring minors to file suit
before they reach majority, was not in effect when the plaintiff's father
died and that but for the MLIIA his suit would not be barred, the
court held limitations had run on the claim.223 As a result, the plaintiff
had no redress for the loss of his father because he failed to file suit
before turning fourteen years old.
In Bradley v. Etessam,2 4 the Dallas Court of Appeals refused to bar
a wrongful death claim instituted by twins against a physician over two
years after their mother's death. 225 However, the court only refused
to bar the claim because it was filed before the children reached age
fourteen and because the decedent had filed a personal injury action
220. 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).
221. 584 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

222. See id. at 324.

223. See id. at 323-24. The Wallace court noted that until enactment of the MLIIA,

a plaintiff's cause of action was governed by TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526,

which provided plaintiffs two years to institute suit, and art. 5535, which tolled stat-

utes of limitations until a minor reached the age of majority. See id. at 323. Thus the
plaintiff would obtain two years after reaching majority to file a wrongful death
claim. See id.
224. 703 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Interestingly, in

reversing the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician on a limitations defense, the court explained that the definition of a
health care liability claim under the MLIIA is not limited to personal injury causes of
action filed by or on behalf of minors for medical injuries, but rather includes minors'
wrongful death claims. See id. at 240-43.
225. See id. at 238-39, 243.
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within two years of the occurrence of the medical tort.226 Following
the mother's death, the court permitted the father to amend the original complaint to include the children's wrongful death claim, stating,
"the plaintiff may later amend to assert additional causes of action
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, and these added
'
The Dallas
causes of action will 'relate back' to the original filing."227
Court of Appeals held that because the parents filed a medical malpractice suit within two years of the tort, all causes of action stemming
from the malpractice were preserved.228 As a result, the children's
subsequent death suit was not barred. 2 9
In Bangert v. Baylor College of Medicine2 3 a death action was
brought against a physician and a medical school on behalf of a thirteen year old minor more than two years after his mother's death.23 '
The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants on a limitations
defense and remanded the case, holding that a minor's cause of action,
once accrued, is a personal cause of action and is independently subject to limitations. 32 The Bangert court reasoned that a death suit is
derivative in nature and that the defendants failed to prove that the
minor's death claim was extinguished or never accrued, or that once
accrued, it was barred by limitations.2 33 Thus, the appellate court held
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.2 34 The appelate
court concluded the mother had a viable personal injury cause of action at the time of her death because she died within two years of the
occurrence of the medical tort.235 Therefore, the court reasoned, the
minor also had a viable death action, provided his action was not independently barred by limitations.236 Because the minor was less than
fourteen-years old when the suit was filed, the court stated his action
was not independently barred by limitations as the minority tolling
provision preserved his claim until he reached age fourteen.237 The
majority, however, rejected the dissent's argument that the minor had
226. See id. at 238-39, 242.
227. Id. at 240.
228. See id. at 240, 242.
229. See id. at 239.
230. 881 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
231. See id. at 565 & n.1.
232. See id. at 566-67 & n.4.
233. See id. at 567.
234. See id. at 565-67. A party moving for summary judgment based on a limitations defense must conclusively prove that limitations have run. See Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996). However, "If the nonmovant asserts that a
tolling provision applies, the movant must conclusively negate the tolling provision's
application to show his entitlement to summary judgment." Id. (citations omitted).
235. See Bangert, 881 S.W.2d at 566.
236. See id. at 566-67.
237. See id. Under the MLIIA statute of limitations, minors currently have two
years after reaching their twelfth birthday to file a claim. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN.art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
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a derivative claim falling under the Wrongful Death Act because he
was not the person directly injured.238 Nevertheless, the majority
noted that the minor's claim would likewise not be barred under the
Wrongful Death Act,2 3because
it permits minors to toll limitations until
9
they reach majority.

In Povolish v. Bethania Regional Health Care Center,2 4 ° two young
adults, alleging medical malpractice caused the death of their mother,
brought suit against several physicians and a health care center. 24 1 At
the time of their mother's death, the children were sixteen and seventeen-years old.242 At the time they filed suit, the children were eighteen and nineteen years old.243 Although the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that limitations had run on the
claim, the court regretfully stated it did so only because it felt bound
by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Rose,24 upholding the legislature's authority to limit statutory causes of action.245 However, the
Pavolish court urged the Texas Supreme Court to revisit the issue of
whether the MLIIA's limitations period violates minors' constitutional rights by prematurely cutting off their causes of action for
wrongful death, stating:
If minors are to be given full protection as to the time they are allowed to bring suit for their personal injuries, appellants who have
lost a parent due to the same type of negligence should be even
equally, if not more, deserving of legal protection.
We are unable to discern why there is such a narrow exception to
the general provision that a minor child has until two years after
their eighteenth birthday to bring suit. We urge the Supreme Court
to revisit whether the statute of limitation provision of the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, as it applies to minor
claimants, violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Texas
246
Constitution.

In Hogan v. Hallman,247 the Houston Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals questioned the equity of barring minors' medical wrongful

death claims before they reach majority. In Hogan, twin sons, upon
turning age eighteen, immediately filed a wrongful death suit against a
238. See id. at 566 & n.3.
239. See id.
240. 905 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
241. See id. at 67.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 68 (citations omitted).
245. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) (holding the Legislature may limit damages in wrongful death actions under the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act).
246. Povolish, 905 S.W.2d at 68 (citing Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 339
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)). See also TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1986).
247. 889 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
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physician and a hospital for causing the death of their mother. 248
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants based
on a limitations defense because the mother had died thirteen years
earlier, following a pulmonary lobectomy (a surgical removal of a lobe
of the lung) when the twin boys were age five.249 On appeal, the twin
sons argued their claim was viable at the time of filing because their
mother had a viable claim for medical malpractice at the time of her
death and that their mother's viable health care liability claim preserved their claim until they reached majority. 250 Alternatively, they
argued the general tolling provision of the Wrongful Death Act controlled and gave them one year after reaching majority to institute
suit. 25 1 The court, however, held the MLIIA controlled and its minority tolling provision did not preserve their claim because the provision,
as written, only tolls the commencement of limitations until minors
reach age fourteen.252
The sons further asserted that the MLIIA was unconstitutional because the short limitations period violated the due process, equal protection, and open courts provisions of the United States and Texas
Constitutions by imposing on them an impossible burden.253 They argued they could not legally file a claim in their own right until they
attained majority and could not possibly comply with the statute's filing requirements before turning age eighteen.254 Yet, upon reaching
majority, when first capable of instituting a claim, their claim was already barred.255
The Hogan court held the MLIIA did not violate the Texas open
courts provision and was not unconstitutional as applied to their claim
because the twins asserted a statutory death claim, not a common law
claim for personal injury.256 Furthermore, the court found no violation of the due process or equal protection provisions of the United
States and Texas Constitutions because of the presumption favoring
257
legislative acts as rationally related to legitimate state interests.
The Hogan court reasoned that because the legislature creates statutory causes of action, it is free to limit, modify, or extinguish them as
long as the statute limiting a claimant's right has a legitimate purpose. 258 Nonetheless, the court showed sympathy for the sons' plight
stating:
248. See id. at 335.
249. See id.
250. See id.

251. See id. at 335-36.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id.
id. at
id.
id. at

336.
337.
336-37.
338-39.
339-40.
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But for the rationale of Rose, we would be hard pressed to justify
the constitutionality of article 4590i, § 10 under an equal protection
analysis. The application of this act to require minors who lose a
parent to alleged medical malpractice to bring their suits by the time
they reach fourteen years of age, while minors whose parents were
killed due to other types of negligence have until their259twentieth
birthday, seem to us an unequal application of the law.
The court expressed reservations about whether the distinction between common law and statutory causes of action should preclude minors with medical wrongful death claims from obtaining
compensation. 26° Recognizing an injustice, the Hogan court urged the
Texas Supreme Court to revisit the issue of whether the MLIIA statute of limitations effectively restricts a class of minors from instituting
medical wrongful death suits, and whether this restriction violates the
equal protection clause because minors with nonmedical wrongful
death claims have until their twentieth birthdays to institute suits,
while minors with medical wrongful death suits have only until their
fourteenth birthdays to file similar claims. 26 1 Nevertheless, the Hogan
court, feeling bound by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Rose,
reluctantly held the minors' medical wrongful death claim was barred
because limitations had run.262 Thus, because the twins did not file a
claim until they reached majority, the court held their suit was
barred.26 3

2. Adults' Causes of Action
The issue of whether an adult medical wrongful death beneficiary
may employ the minority tolling provision to toll the commencement
of limitations because the decedent was a child initially proved problematic for Texas courts, largely because of the derivative nature of a
death claim. 26 4 Because the minority tolling provision tolled the commencement of limitations on a minor's personal injury claim before
his death, courts debated whether the provision also tolled the commencement of limitations on an adult's subsequent wrongful death
claim or whether limitations commenced on an adult beneficiary's
claim upon the occurrence of the underlying medical tort because the
benefit of tolling inures only to the disabled minor child.26 5
259. Id. at 339.
260. See id. at 339-40.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 340.
263. See id.
264. See Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam).
265. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 922 S.W.2d at 121; Cestro v. Medina, 781 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1989, no writ); Valdez v. Texas Children's Hosp., 673
S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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The first court to address the issue of whether an adult MLIIA
wrongful death beneficiary gained additional filing time based on a
decedent child's disability was Valdez v. Texas Children's Hospital.2"
In Valdez, a mother brought a medical malpractice action against a
hospital over two years after her minor child's death, arguing the
child's death suspended the commencement of limitations for one
year.267 The Houston First District Court of Appeals held the adult's
medical death claim was barred because a health care liability claim
must be filed within two years of the occurrence of the medical tort.26
However, addressing how the MLIIA relates to the Wrongful Death
Act, the Valdez court concluded that because the purposes and goals
of the two statutes are separate and distinct, the statutes should be
harmonized.269 Therefore, although the Houston court refused to toll
limitations on the mother's death claim, it allowed a one year tolling
extension on the decedent's estate's survival claim.27 °
The Eastland Court of Appeals, however, reached a different result
in Cestro v. Medina.27 ' In Cestro, a mother sued a physician for the
death of her minor son.2 72 On appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant physician based on a limitations defense, the
mother contended the MLIIA's limitations provision violated the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution as applied to a minor's cause of action.27 3 In effect, the plaintiff sought to use her deceased son's minor status to toll the commencement of limitations
from the time of the occurrence of the defendant's malpractice until
the time of her minor son's death because the additional time would
prevent her claim from being time-barred.
266. 673 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
267. See id. at 343. Not surprisingly, after extensive research, the author failed to
find any case law where an adult wrongful death beneficiary has argued limitations
should be tolled indefinitely because the minor decedent will never reach majority.
268. See id. at 345.
269. See id. at 344-45. Valdez specifically addressed whether the limitations period
contained in article 5538 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (current
version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.062 (Vernon 1986)) suspended
the running the MLIIA limitations period. See Valdez, 673 S.W.2d at 344.
270. See id. at 345. In Texas, a survival claim is a claim asserted on the decedent's
behalf and is wholly derivative of the decedent's right to sue for an actionable wrong
suffered prior to death. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.021 (Vernon 1986);
Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1992). Recoverable damages
include damages sustained by the decedent before death, but not any damages
claimed by the beneficiaries for their own loss. See id. Further, with survival actions,
Any recovery obtained flows to those who would have received it had he
obtained it immediately prior to his death-that is, his heirs, legal representatives and estate. Defenses that could have been raised against a claim by
the injured person may also be raised against the same claim asserted by the
person's heirs and estate.

Id. at 345 (citation omitted).

271. 781 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1989, no writ).
272. See id. at 641 & nn.1-2.
273. See id. at 641.
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The Eastland Court of Appeals held that because the minor was
deceased, the minority tolling provision did not preserve her claim. 4
Further, the court concluded the MLIIA statute of limitations was not
unconstitutional, as applied to adult litigants, because adults have an
adequate opportunity to discover injuries and causes of action while
reasonable time remains to bring suit.275 Consequently, the mother
was prohibited from using her son's minority status to toll the commencement of limitations on her death claim.2 76
In Arredondo v. Hilliard,277 a mother sued a physician and a hospital for the death of her infant son.27 8 Although the mother filed the
claim exactly two years after her son's death, two years and two days
had passed since the physician treated the minor child. 79 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on
a limitations defense, which subsequently became the sole point of
error on appeal.28° On appeal, the mother alleged the limitations pro274. See id. See also Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 67, 73 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied) ("[T]he statute of limitations would never run in a
situation where a child dies and therefore never reaches the age of fourteen.").
275. See Cestro, 781 S.W.2d at 642. See also Radloff v. Dorman, 924 S.W.2d 416
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ fied) (holding four months between the plaintiff's
discovery of the cause of action and expiration of two-year limitations period was a
reasonable time to bring suit); Neagle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1995, writ denied) (holding the plaintiffs cause of action was time-barred because she
failed to file suit within one year of discovering her injury); Fiore v. HCA Serv. of
Tex., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (holding, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiffs failure to file suit within a year after learning of her
misdiagnosis barred her claim); LaGesse v. Primacare, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied) (holding the plaintiff's action was barred because
she did not file her claim within one year of discovering her injury); Holt v. Epley, 894
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied) (holding the plaintiff's action
was time-barred because she was aware of her injury, its cause and the defendant's
identity within eight months of the accrual of her cause of action); Adkins v. Tafel,
871 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (holding eighteen months was
a sufficient time period to file a cause of action under the MLIIA when a plaintiff was
aware of his injury and cause of action); Work v. Duvall, 809 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding four months was a sufficient time to file
suit for a medical malpractice claim under the MLIIA when the plaintiff had discovered his injury and cause of action); Shidaker v. Winsett, 805 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1991, writ denied) (holding the MLIIA statute of limitations barred a beneficiary's medical wrongful death claim because the decedent was aware of his cause of
action for thirteen months and he died four months before limitations ran, leaving the
beneficiary a sufficient time to institute suit); Rivera v. Mitchell, 764 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, no writ) (holding an eleven month period to file a claim was
sufficient under the MLIIA as the plaintiff was aware of his cause of action); Reed v.
Wershba, 698 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding
thirteen months was a reasonable time to file suit after the plaintiff discovered his
injury).
276. See Cestro, 781 S.W.2d at 642.
277. 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995), rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l
Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
278. See id. at 756.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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vision violated the due process and open courts provisions of the
Texas Constitution and that the statute of limitations
on her death
28
claim was tolled based on her son's minority. '
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed in a two-to-one decision.28 2 The court held the defendants failed to sustain the burden of
proof that limitations were not tolled due to the infant's minority status and that the infant's cause of action was not viable at the time of
his death.3 The court reasoned that because the minority tolling
provision tolled the commencement of limitations on the minor's personal injury claim for the two days before his death, then due to the
derivative nature of a death action, the adult mother also obtained the
two day tolling benefit.284 Consequently, under the court of appeal's
reasoning, the mother could effectively obtain two years from the date
of the child's death or two years and two days from the occurrence of
the defendant's negligence to file her wrongful death suit.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed in Baptist Memorial
Hospital System v. Arredondo,285 holding the mother's wrongful death
claim was barred by limitations and that the appellate court had incorrectly applied the minority tolling provision.
The Baptist Memorial
court explained:
[The minority tolling] provision tolls a claim's accrualonly when it is
filed by a minor or on a minor's behalf A statutory beneficiary files
a wrongful death action to recover her own damages based on a
minor's death. Therefore, the tolling provision of section 10.01 that
applies to a minor does not apply to an adult's wrongful death
claims. 2s
Consequently, the court held because the mother was an adult beneficiary, the MLIIA's minority tolling provision did not apply.288 Therefore, because her claim was filed two years and two days following the
defendant's act of malpractice, her wrongful death action was
barred. 289
B.

Other Jurisdictions

Some jurisdictions toll limitations on minors' medical wrongful
death claims until they reach majority.29° Public policy considerations
281. See id.
282. See id. at 756, 761.
283. See id. at 761.

284. See id.

285. 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
286. See id. at 121.
287. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Regents of the Univ. of N.M.
v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (holding the minority of a decedent does not
inure to the benefit of an adult wrongful death beneficiary).

288. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 922 S.W.2d at 121.

289. See id. at 120-21.
290. See supra note 202
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have motivated courts in jurisdictions outside Texas to find methods
to provide children with legal protection and adequate time to institute suit to recover compensation for injuries.29 '
For example, in Taylor v. Giddens,292 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held a minor's medical wrongful death action fell outside the prescriptive limitations period of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act.2 93
The court refused to hold children to the limitations period contained
in the medical act and allowed them to sue for the death of their
mother. 294 Citing public policy reasons for its decision, the Louisiana
court reasoned that the state has an interest in protecting the family
unit, in providing compensation for injuries, and in preventing constitutional challenges by ensuring that the class of medical wrongful
death claimants have access to the courts for a reasonable time after a
death occurs.2 95 Therefore, the court interpreted death actions as falling outside the scope of the medical act.29 6 The court noted that a

Louisiana wrongful death action is not dependant upon the decedent
having a viable cause of action at death and that limitations com291. See supra note 202.
292. 618 So. 2d 834 (La. 1993).
293. See id. at 841. The Louisiana medical statute, art. 5628, stated:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, dentist, psychologist, hospital duly licensed under the laws of this
state, or community blood center or tissue bank as defined in R.S.
40:1299.41(a), whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise,
arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from
the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect or within one year from the
date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; however, even as to
claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events
such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the
date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
The provisions of the Section shall apply to all persons whether or not
infirm or under disability of any kind and including minors and interdicts.
LSA-R.S. 9:5628.
294. See Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841-42.
295. See id. at 841. The court explained:
The interpretation that wrongful death actions are not within the ambit of
LSA-R.S. 9:5628 also balances the interest of society, by allowing that class
of tort claimants an opportunity to recover damages from the tortfeasor,
against the interest of the public in controlling medical costs, since wrongful
death actions have limited types of damages and, generally, the causal connection declines as the period between the alleged act of malpractice and the
date of death lengthens.
Id. at 842.
296. See id. at 841. The court stated,
Though it [a wrongful death action] may have its genesis in an act of [medical] malpractice, a wrongful death action is not a malpractice action. From
its inception, the action exists only in favor of the victim's beneficiaries.
Therefore, it is not controlled by the prescriptive period for medical malpractice actions. The reference to action for death in LSA-R.S. 9:5628 applies solely to survival actions as they are derivative of the malpractice
victim's action.
Id. (citation omitted).
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mence upon death because that is the date a beneficiary is injured.2 97
The court reasoned such an interpretation "balances the interest of
society, by allowing that class of tort claimants an opportunity to recover damages from the tortfeasor,
against the interest of the public in
298
CoStS.
medical
controlling
Similarly, in Kohrt v. Yetter,2 99 the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted

two seemingly conflicting provisions of its medical malpractice act and
held its minority tolling provision operated to extend limitations for
personal injury and death actions until one year after a minor reaches
majority. 300 The court found the minority tolling provision was not in
conflict with the limitation provision in the medical act requiring actions to be brought within six years of the occurrence of the act or
omission causing injury because minority was a delineated exception.3° ' Moreover, the court held that the limitations provision related
only to the type of action, a medical malpractice claim, while the tolling provision related to a class of claimants, minors.30 2
In short, in the interest of equity, other jurisdictions have endeavored to ensure minors receive adequate time to pursue legal actions
after disabilities are removed. These jurisdictions refuse to bar minors' claims through short, strict limitations periods contained in med297. See id. at 840-41. The court explained that if the Louisiana Medical Statute
controlled the prescriptive period for wrongful death actions, a certain class
of wrongful death claimants would be time-barred from filing suit before
their cause of action even arose. The statute would not equally affect all
medical malpractice wrongful death claimants or treat them the same.
Wrongful death claimants whose malpractice victim died within the prescriptive period would be allowed to seek damages, while those whose malpractice victim died after expiration of the malpractice action prescriptive
period would be denied the right to seek damages. Their remedy to address
their civil wrong would have been eliminated prior to the accrual of their
cause of action. Such a result is intolerable, as it discriminates among
wrongful death tort claimants.
Id. at 841.
298. See id. at 842.
299. 344 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa 1984).
300. See id. at 246-48.
301. See id. The Iowa medical act's statute of limitations provision provides,
Those [claims] founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against
any physician ...arising out of patient care, within two years after the date
on which the claimant knew, or through reasonable diligence should have
known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death
for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs
first, but in no event shall any action be brought more than six years after
the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in the
action to have been the cause of the injury or death unless a foreign object
unintentionally left in the body caused the injury or death.
Iowa Code § 614.1(9) (1981). The tolling provision for minors stated, "The times limited for actions herein, except those brought for penalties and forfeitures, shall be
extended in favor of minors and mentally ill persons, so that they have one year from
and after the termination of such disability within which to commence said action."
Id.
302. See Kohrt, 344 N.W.2d at 248.
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ical malpractice statutes.3 °3 Further, in some jurisdictions, medical
death claims are deemed new causes of action arising at the time of
death and are not interpreted as derivative claims.330° In other jurisdictions, disability is recognized as a personal right.305 Consequently,
if a death claim is not derivative, there can be no bootstrapping of a
minor's disability onto an adult's wrongful death claim, and a decedent's right to sue for his own injuries is separate from a beneficiary's
right to sue for the decedent's death. Noticeably absent from other
jurisdictions are cases where adults may use a medical statute's minority tolling provision to toll the commencement of limitations based on
a decedent child's disability. Other states either employ the equitable
doctrine of the discovery rule,3 06 allow claimants to file medical
wrongful death claims under wrongful death statutes instead of medical malpractice statutes, 0 7 or include separate limitations periods for
medical claims resulting in death,30 8 to ensure that medical malpractice victims' rights are not prematurely terminated.
V.

THE MLIIA MINORITY

TOLLING PROVISION SHOULD BE
AMENDED OR HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Texas Legislature should amend the MLIIA minority tolling
provision to preserve minors' claims until they reach majority. Tolling
the commencement of limitations on minors' claims until they attain
majority is consistent with the treatment minors historically receive in
tort law, is equitable, and meets equal protection requirements. Alternatively, the Texas Supreme Court should hold that the MLIIA violates the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution because it
unreasonably and arbitrarily restricts minors' rights to assert medical
wrongful death claims.
303. See supra note 202.
304. See supra note 204.
305. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M.
1985) (holding the minority of a decedent does not inure to the benefit of an adult
wrongful death beneficiary and that the minority tolling benefit ends upon the death
of the minor or upon the minor attaining the specified age because "minority savings
clauses are enacted to allow time for the full scope of a child's injury to become apparent, to enable the child to become competent to testify, or to allow the child to act
for himself after the disability has been removed.").

306. See, e.g., Carter v. University of Med. and Dentistry, 838 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.J.
1993); Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1994); Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d
961 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).

307. See, e.g., Cramsey v. Knoblock, 547 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Fetterolf
v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 1020 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).

308. See, e.g., James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d 695 (Ariz. 1987) (en
banc); Armijo, 704 P.2d at 429; Bruce v. Byer, 423 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (1996) (three-year statute of limitations commence on an action for death of a minor who was under age four at the time of injury
or on the minor's eighth birthday, or when the minor dies, whichever occurs first).
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Legislative and Judicial Treatment Of Minors Historically
Includes Tolling Limitations Until Minors Reach Majority

Texas has traditionally viewed minors as a group meriting special
legal protection." 9 "Historically, Texas has always been protective of
its minor children involved in the legal process. It has continuously
provided statutory protection by deferring the time in which minors
could file suit for injury to two years after attaining their majority."31
In fact, the numerous Texas statutes allowing minors to toll the commencement of limitations until they attain majority evidence a legislative view 31that minors are incapable of filing claims while under a
disability. '
309. The legal disability of minority has traditionally been recognized in Texas. "At
one time, the Texas Constitution tolled limitations for minors for seven years after
removal of disabilities." Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 14 (1869)). For
instance, in McDonald v. Proctor& Gamble Co., the court held that the Texas tolling
statute, under which a person under age eighteen was considered to be under a legal
disability, applied to wrongful death claims. See 748 F. Supp. at 474-75. The court
stated: "[A] person is under a legal disability if the person is younger than eighteen
(18) years of age and that if a person who is entitled to bring a personal action is
under a legal disability when the cause of action accrues the time of disability is not
included in the limitation period." Id.
310. Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339 (citing Act of February 5, 1841, Laws of the Republic of Texas, at 166; 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 630 (1898); TEX. CONST. art. XII,
§ 14 (1869) and TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon 1958) (current version
at TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1986))). See also Flores v.
Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 983 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (holding
the two year limitations period (TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (current version
at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (West 1995))) for a civil rights action
was tolled due to the plaintiffs minority status until two years after a minor attains
majority, age eighteen, to file a claim); Texas Utils. Co. v. West, 59 S.W.2d 459, 460-61
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (tolling the commencement of limitations on children's death claim for the loss of their father).
311. The general tolling provision applicable to minors with tort claims is Texas
Practice and Remedies Code 16.001. It provides:
(a) For the purposes of this subchapter, a person is under a legal disability if
the person is:
(1) younger than 18 years of age, regardless of whether the person is
married...
(b) If a person entitled to bring a personal action is under a legal disability
when the cause of action accrues, the time of the disability is not included in
a limitations period.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1986). "[A tolling provision]
simply gives a person under a legal disability an extension of time beyond accrual of
the cause of action within which to bring his suit. .

. ."

McDonald, 748 F. Supp. at 475.

Interestingly, in Johnston v. United States, the Fifth Circuit recently held that, under
the Federal Torts Claims Act, a mother and son's wrongful death claim, brought over
two years after the patient's death and premised on medical malpractice was not
barred by the MLIIA's limitations period. See Johnson v. United States, 85 F.3d 217,
224 (5th Cir. 1996). After noting that wrongful death actions are derivative suits in
Texas, the court held that as a matter of law, a wrongful death claim cannot accrue
prior to death. See id. at 224. In analyzing the interaction of the MLIIA, its limitations provision and wrongful death claims, the Fifth Circuit stated: "The legislature,
by tinkering with the accrual date of one class of wrongful death claims, has in effect
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The Texas judiciary likewise recognizes minors need legal protection. For example, in Weiner v. Wasson,312 the Texas Supreme Court
held limitations do not commence upon a minor's medical personal
injury claim until he reaches majority, despite the MLIIA's requirement that minors institute suit by age fourteen.313 The same public
policy arguments that support tolling the commencement of limitations on minors' medical personal injury claims and on minors' nonmedical wrongful death claims supports tolling the commencement of
limitations on minors' medical wrongful death claims, because medical
wrongful death minors suffer injuries and are likewise incapable of
instituting suits while under a disability.
In enacting the MLIIA, the Texas Legislature clearly recognized
that minors merit special legal protection and included the minority
tolling provision in the Act.314 However, in order to file a death claim,
a child must be free of a legal disability. Thus, MLIIA legislators simply failed to afford minors adequate time to institute suits. Consequently, amending the statute to grant minors two years after
attaining majority to file claims will afford them a reasonable amount
of time to institute suit. In keeping with the Texas tradition of protecting minors by preserving their claims until they reach majority, the
Texas Legislature and judiciary should not abandon injured children
merely because tortfeasors are health care providers.
B.

Equity Dictates Tolling Limitations Until Minors Reach Majority

Equity dictates tolling the commencement of limitations because
"[a] child has no right to bring a cause of action on his own unless
disability has been removed. ' 315 Yet, the MLIIA currently bars medical wrongful death minors' claims before they escape minority or
places children wholly at the mercy of parents or guardians to pursue
death claims within the prescribed time. As illustrated in Bradley v.
shortened the period in which such plaintiffs can bring suit." See id. at 223. The Fifth
Circuit, in refusing to bar the claim, cited the need for uniformity and equity in the
law and held that while the MLIIA may determine whether a cause of action exists,
federal law determines when the claim accrues. See id. at 219.
312. See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
313. See id. at 321. In Sax, the Texas Supreme Court, using similar reasoning,
struck down the statute of limitation of the MLIIA's predecessor, which required minors to fie a medical negligence claim by age eight. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d
661, 663 (Tex. 1983). Further, in Bradley v. Etessam, the Dallas Court of Appeals

reasoned that the MLIIA was not limited to personal injury causes of action filed by
or on behalf of minors for medical injuries to themselves, but instead, extended to

minors' death claims caused by medical malpractice. See Bradley v. Etessam, 703
S.W.2d 237, 243 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Moreover, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals in Westphal, held that the minority tolling provision applies
when children are under twelve and extends the time they may bring medical death
claims. See Westphal v. Diaz, 918 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,
no writ).
314. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
315. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666 (citations omitted).
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Etessam,3 16 a MLIIA wrongful death minor is barred from suit unless

a diligent adult files a claim on her behalf within the allotted time
period.3 1 7 Practically speaking, this means that medical wrongful
death minors receive compensation only if a diligent adult pursues
their claims within the prescribed time. A statute only granting a minor the right to institute suit to receive compensation for the loss of a
parent or guardian if that minor can rely on a diligent adult to file suit
on his behalf within the prescribed time, while foreclosing a minor
from instituting suit who cannot rely on a diligent adult to pursue his
claim within the prescribed time, is illogical and inequitable. The
harsh reality is that some children will never receive an opportunity to
institute a medical wrongful death suit if the legislature or the judiciary does not act to preserve childrens' rights. The MLIIA scheme is
thus inadequate because minors are forced to rely on others to institute suit on their behalf. Minors are thereby placed in untenable positions, as the very person who provided for their basic needs may be
the subject of a wrongful death suit. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme
Court has already found it unrealistic and unreasonable to assume
that all parents will act to preserve children's claims or that children
have the sophistication required to file claims while still under the disability of minority.318
Admittedly, medical insurance rates may decrease if children are
precluded from filing medical wrongful death suits. However, the
long-term cost of such a policy is detrimental to society and is devastating for many children. The Texas Supreme Court, in Sanchez v.
Schindler,319 held injuries to the familial relationship are significant
and thus allowed pecuniary compensation for wrongful death claims
in the interest of equity.32 0 In contrast, the MLIIA seeks to foreclose
minors' medical wrongful death suits before they even obtain the legal
right to file a claim. Thus, for medical wrongful death minors, the
remedy may not only be inadequate, it may be non-existent. It is patently unfair that minors should suffer the most egregious injury-loss
316. 730 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
317. See id. at 243.
318. See, e.g., Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667. Furthermore, the Ohio Court of Appeals in
Young v. Napoleon Board of Education, 637 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), reasoned that a child's parent or guardian will not always file suit on the child's behalf
because parents may be lethargic, ignorant, lack concern or a child may effectively be
without a parent or guardian. See id. at 395. The Ohio court concluded that the state
statute requiring a minor to file suit when he has no standing to sue because he is
under the legal disability of minority, and that foreclosed his right to sue thereafter
"was totally unreasonable and patently unfair." Id. As one commentator noted,
"[T]he interests of [minor] claimants, ostensibly protected by the legislature, should
[not] be destructible by the apathy of others." Developments In The Law-Statutes
of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1230 (1950).
319. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
320. See id. at 252. The Sanchez court stated, "This court has always endeavored
to interpret the laws of Texas to avoid inequity." Id.
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of a family member-and receive no opportunity to obtain compensation simply because health care providers insurance rates were construed as too high.
C. Differential Treatment Of Medical Wrongful Death Minors
Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Texas
Constitution
"The United States Constitution provides that no state shall deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Our state constitution provides that all free men have equal rights."32 '
The Texas equal protection clause requires that all persons similarly
situated be treated alike.32 2 The clause is intended to restrict legislative actions that conflict with elemental constitutional principles.323
Specifically, the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution is
designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled
out and subject to discriminatory treatment.324 Thus, "The Equal Protection Clause requires a state ... to apply its rules and regulations in
a fair and equitable manner, and not to irrationally classify its
'
citizens."325
Texas follows federal standards when determining whether a statute
violates the equal protection guarantee.326 A legislative classification
against a class of persons violates the
that invidiously discriminates
327
equal protection clause.
1. Classes of Persons
The MLIIA creates two classes of persons within the MLIIA: minors forced to rely on others to file claims on their behalf or be foreclosed from suit by age fourteen, and adults under no disability, who
receive two years to file the same claim.328 Likewise, two classes of
persons are created through interstatutory comparison: minors with
medical death claims who lose the right to file suit at age fourteen, and
321. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) (citing U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 3). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that although there is not an equal protection of the laws
clause in the Bill of Rights, unreasonable class discrimination violates due process).
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "All free men, when they form a social compact,
have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public
emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Id.
322. See Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1981); Automaxx, Inc. v. Morales, 906 F.
Supp. 394, 401 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
323. See Pyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
324. See Nelson v. Clements, 831 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
denied).
325. Levine v. Maverick Co. Water & Imp. Dist. No. 1, 884 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
326. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 846.
327. See Automaxx, 906 F. Supp. at 401; Nelson, 831 S.W.2d at 590.
328. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996).
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minors with nonmedical death claims, who retain, the right to file suit
until reaching age twenty or until two years following the removal of
the disability of minority.329 Thus, the MLIIA discriminates against
the class of children with medical death claims, as opposed to adults
330
with medical death claims or minors with nonmedical death claims.

However, discriminatory treatment does not itself violate the equal
protection clause. Rather, "When analyzing a statute drawing a distinction between classes of persons, the standard of review depends
upon the nature of the classification."' 33 The constitutionality of statutes are evaluated under different levels of judicial scrutiny.332 If a
statutory classification involves a fundamental constitutional right or a
suspect classification, the statute is evaluated under a strict scrutiny
standard.333 Conversely, if the classification does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification, the state must only show a rational relationship exists between the statutory restriction and the
statute's stated purposes. 334 Neither age nor the right to recover in
tort involve fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifica329. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 1996)
with TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 16.003(b) (West 1986).
330. No one disputes the fact that the medical malpractice statute discriminates
against the class of medical malpractice tort claimants, as compared to the other
classes of tort claimants. See Redish, supra note 5, at 769. Indeed, the primary inquiry is whether such discrimination is constitutionally permissible. See id. Critics
view the MLIIA as vulnerable to constitutional challenges because the Act places
"limits on plaintiffs recovery, thereby depriving medical malpractice victims of previously existing legal benefits and rights." Keith, supra note 3, at 319. In fact, the Texas
Trial Lawyers Association publicly opposed the Keeton Commission's recommendations stating they "would have the effect of either placing the medical community in a
preferential position before the law or to infringe upon a citizen's right to equal protection before the law." Sherman & Pate, supra note 4, at 342 (quoting the Texas

Trial Lawyers Association News Release, December 8, 1976). Critics also alleged the
changes seriously weakened the traditional tort system in two major respects. First, special treatment and immunities would be given to only one
0 class of potential defendants (health care providers). Second, potential
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases would not have an equal opportunity
for relief from negligence claims as other plaintiffs in nonmedical malpractice cases.
Id. at 342-43.
331. See Detar v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ).
332. See Automaxx v. Morales, 906 F. Supp. 394, 401 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
333. See id. at 401.
334. See Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1986). Traditionally, courts uphold legislative classifications under the rational basis standard. See
Redish, supra note 5, at 770. However, "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 648 (1975). In fact, a court "need not in equal protection cases accept at face
value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative
scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a
goal of the legislation." Id. at 648 & n.16 (citation omitted).
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tions.335 Thus, to withstand constitutionality scrutiny, Texas must only
show that the time limitation imposed by the MLIIA on medical
wrongful death minors rationally relates to the MLIIA's stated purposes.33 6 If a rational relationship is lacking, however, the MLIIA
limitations provision must be held unconstitutional as it applies to minors asserting medical wrongful death claims.33 7
2. The Stated Purpose
The stated purposes of the MLIIA are contained in the findings and
purposes section.338 This section states:
[I]t is the purpose of this Act to improve and modify the system by
which health care liability claims are determined in order to:
335. See Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding children are not a suspect class under the equal protection clause); Hatten v. Rains, 854
F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating age is not a suspect classification for purposes of
equal protection); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(holding the right to recover in tort is not a suspect classification); Pavlovish v.
Bethania Reg'l Health Care Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no
writ) (stating age is not a suspect classification); Castillo v. Hidalgo Co. Water Dist.
No. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (holding the
right to sue under the Wrongful Death Act is not a fundamental right for purposes of
equal protection analysis).
336. See Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1106. The rational relationship test requires
that a statute have a "legitimate state interest to rationalize a denial of equal protection." Id. "The question then is whether the differential treatment involved bears a
rational or reasonable relationship to legitimate state interests." Keith, supra note 3,
at 324.
When courts evaluate legislative classifications for equal protection violations: the question for the court's determination becomes whether or not
the litigant's right of redress is in some manner outweighed by the legislative
basis for the statute imposing disabilities. In making such a determination,
the courts should consider both the general purpose of the statute and the
extent to which the litigant's right to redress is affected.
Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985,
no writ).
337. See Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1107. A statute "which singles out a particular
class, or makes distinctions... must bear a reasonable relationship to the underlying
purpose of the statute, and that purpose must be legitimate." Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994). Further, "a statute based on pure favoritism which creates a closed class will likely be declared unconstitutional." Id. at 607-08
(citations omitted). Courts commenting on equal protection violations have explained, "equal protection is denied if the legislature has made an irrational or arbitrary classification." Miller v. Kretz, 531 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The
inquiry in equal protection is "whether the connection between the benefit sought to
be conferred on society and the means employed to accomplish it, when weighed
against the inequalities created by the statute's classifications, is so attenuated and
remote as to constitute an unreasonable exercise of police power." Smith v. Schulte,
670 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1849 (1996) (quoting Moore
v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 167 (Ala. 1991)).
338. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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(1) reduce excessive frequency and severity of health care liability claims through reasonable improvements and modifications in
the Texas insurance, tort, and medical practice systems;
(2) decrease the cost of those claims and assure that awards are
rationally related to actual damages;
(3) do so in a manner that will not unduly restrict a claimant's
rights any more than necessary to deal with the crisis;
(4) make available to physicians, hospitals, and other health care
providers protection against potential liability through the insurance
mechanism at reasonably affordable rates;
(5) make affordable medical and health care more accessible and
available to the citizens of Texas;
(6) make certain modifications in the medical, insurance, and
legal systems in order to determine whether or not there will be an
effect on rates charged by insurers for medical professional liability
insurance; and
(7) make certain modifications to the liability laws as they relate
to health care liability claims only and with an intention of the legislature to not extend or apply such modifications of liability
laws to
339
any other area of the Texas legal system or tort law
As previously stated, a statute's stated purposes are presumptively
legitimate. Thus, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, it is
assumed the legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily. 340
"However, the presumption of constitutionality is rebuttable on a
showing that the legislation or regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare."3 4 '
3.

The Legislative Means Adopted to Achieve the State Purpose

To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the equal protection clause requires that the legislative means adopted to achieve the state purpose
rationally relates to the statute's stated purposes.3 42 In other words,
the restriction-the time limit requiring minors to institute suit by age
fourteen-must rationally relate to the statute's stated purposes.
339. Id. (emphasis added). "The specific purpose of the [MLIIA] minority tolling
provision was to limit the length of time that the insureds would be exposed to potential liability. The method by which the legislature chose to affect those [statute's]
purposes is outlined in § 10.01, the minority tolling provision." Hogan v. Hallman,
889 S.W.2d 332, 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

340. See Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ); Battaille v. Yoffe, 882 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
writ denied).
341. Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
342. See Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1981).
343. See id.
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While Texas courts usually do not inquire into the legislature's wisdom in prescribing statutes of limitations, courts should invalidate
statutes of limitations when time periods are so short that they
amount to legal bars and denials of reasonable opportunities to bring
claims. 3" Generally, "When the party has free access to the courts for
a period of time sufficient for the ordinarily diligent person to commence legal proceedings to protect his rights, the limitations period is
considered reasonable and adequate." 5 However, when limitations,
in effect, abolish a cause of action, the restriction is not mere regula346
tion, but rather, is an abrogation of a right.
The MLIIA abrogates medical wrongful death minors' rights because it abolishes their causes of action before they may institute suit
in their own right. MLIIA legislators, in an effort to lower medical
malpractice insurance rates for health care providers, chose to cut off
minor's rights to institute suit before they reach majority, when they
can first legally institute suit. The MLIIA statute of limitations terminates minors' rights to file medical wrongful death claims at age fourteen and forces children to rely on adults to institute suit before
344. "Generally, a State is free to prescribe a period of limitations within which
claims must be asserted or be barred and such limitation does not constitute a denial
of due process unless the time period is so short as to amount to a denial of a reasonable opportunity to enforce a claim." Neagle v. Nelson, 658 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
However, statutes of limitations assume a party has an opportunity to institute suit.
See Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902). Thus, if the time period is "manifestly so
insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice" courts will hold them unconstitutional. See id.
One commentator noted that California appellate court, holding the California
Medical Compensation Reform Act unconstitutional,
if the medical profession is given special treatment by protective laws that
render the profession less accountable, a consequential relaxation of medical
standards would not benefit the general public because "[t]o find that the
protection and special dispensation given to health care delivery tortfeasors
by the challenged legislation is in the best interest of public health is illogical
to the point of irrationality."
Keith, supra note 3, at 325 (quoting American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., Inc., 660 P.2d 829, 841 (Ca. 1983)).
345. Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
346. The Nelson court stated, "the legislature has no power to make a remedy by
due course of law contingent on an impossible condition." Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984) (citation omitted). The Nelson court affirmed that requiring a child to file a claim while still a minor and prevented by incapacity was an
impossible condition and violative of due process, stating: "Is the requirement of a
thing impossible from an infant, or one incapacitated for any reason due process? We
think not." Id. at 922 (quoting Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 48 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex.
1932)). See also Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 967 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (refusing to hold a wrongful death claimant to the short statute of limitations period in
Arizona's medical malpractice act and stating, "any statute which bars a cause of action before it could legitimately be brought abrogates rather than limits the cause of
action and offends Article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution.").
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limitations run. As a result, any minor on whose behalf an adult does
not institute suit before he reaches age fourteen will find his suit timebarred. Yet, a child barred from suit by an adult's failure to institute
suit on his behalf before limitations run has no alternative remedy
because the doctrine of parent-child immunity prevents a child from
suing negligent parents.
Consequently, if a parent fails to institute
suit on a minor's behalf, the parent effectively forfeits the child's right
to obtain compensation. Such a result is intolerable, and Texas courts
concur stating, "The law does not permit one to forfeit another's
rights."348
The MLIIA's short statute of limitations period unduly restricts minors' rights to institute medical wrongful death claims more than is
necessary to deal with the perceived medical crisis, denies them reasonable opportunities to bring claims and amounts to a legal bar. Barring all minors' medical wrongful death claims not filed by age
fourteen fails to achieve the result of reducing excessive claims, fails
to assure that awards are rationally related to the purpose of the statute, and does not constitute an improvement in the system by which
health care liability claims are determined. Barring all minors' medical wrongful death claims not filed by age fourteen, before minors attain majority does not reduce merely excessive or frivolous claims, but
instead, effectively eliminates all claims filed by minors in their own
right, because no mechanism exists for determining which claims are
meritorious and which are not. The state's interest in lowering medical malpractice insurance rates and ensuring public access to health
care, standing alone, fails to justify denying injured minors any chance
of receiving compensation. 349 A minor's right to institute suit in his
347. See Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (holding the exercise of parental
authority under parent-child immunity doctrine includes discipline and supervision of
a child); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (precluding a child from
instituting suit against his parents for negligence due to parent-child immunity
doctrine).
348. In re Miller, 605 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980),
affd sub nom. In re JAM, 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982).
349. In Pyler v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court stuck down a Texas statute
that allowed the State to withhold education funds from school districts that enrolled
illegal aliens, finding the statute inconsistent with the equal protection clause. See
Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). Although the Court conceded that the state had a
legitimate interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of the influx of
immigrants, the Court nevertheless held the statute did not offer an effective method
of dealing with the problem. See id. at 228-29. The Court stated "even making the
doubtful assumption that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy of the State
is negative, we think it clear that '[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration."' Id. at
228-29 (citation omitted).
After noting that the record failed to suggest that illegal entrants imposed a significant burden on the State's economy, the Court held the statute was unconstitutional,
stating the State must "do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate." Id. at 27-28.
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own right should not be outweighed by the legislative goal of lowering
medical malpractice rates.
While no amount of money can fully compensate a child for suffering the immeasurable loss of a parent, a bar to legal redress imposed
during minority is the antithesis of assuring that awards are rationally
related to actual damages. Rather, the bar assures children left orphaned at the hands of a negligent health care provider receive no
compensation. Thus, the MLIIA's age restriction works the greatest
injustice upon those persons most severely injured by a health care
provider's negligence-children left with no parent.3 5 ° As the court
aptly stated in Waggoner v. Gibson, "limiting the recovery of the most
deserving victims of malpractice is not a legitimate interest of the state
"351

Minors' claims have never been proven to be a predominant factor
in causing the escalation of medical malpractice insurance rates or
health care CoStS. 352 To the contrary, a minor's legal naivety, political
powerlessness, and disability pose great barriers to suit. In fact, the
correlation between the time limitation imposed on medical wrongful
death minors and the reduction in health care insurance costs is too
indirect and remote to justify the harsh restriction.353 The medical
The Court also noted the pivotal role of education and the "lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child." Id. at 221. The Court explained:
Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his
life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it
poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost
or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education within the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 222. The Court also could "perceive no national policy that supports the State
in denying these children an elementary education." Id. at 226. The court explained:
[E]ven if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of
barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State
must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are 'basically indistinguishable' from legally resident alien children.
Id. at 229. Finally, the Court found the statute especially unfair because the statute
sought to punish children for their parents' illegal entry into the country, a matter
over which the children had no control. See id. at 220. Thus, in sum, the Court found
that the undocumented status of the children did not establish a sufficient rational
basis for denying those children the benefits of public education. See id. at 224-25.
350. See Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
351. Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
352. Critics have pointed out that "The statute was enacted to protect a particular
class of tortfeasors-i.e., physicians, hospitals and other health care providers-without extending any of these beneficial reforms to other classes of tortfeasors." Keith,
supra note 3, at 322. See also supra notes, 42, 61, 63, 142, 148, 199.
353. See Detar Hosp. Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, no writ). Cf. Smith, supra note 57, at 221-22. Professional liability insurers and the American Medical Association asserted that minors' claims create a long
term potential for suit and advocated that limitations should require minors to bring
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liability crisis does not necessitate barring all claims filed by minors in
their own right any more than any other crisis necessitates imposing
absolute bars on any one class of plaintiffs.35 4 Indeed, elimination of
all medical malpractice claims should surely result in the greatest reduction in medical liability insurance rates. However, such a result is
clearly absurd. Similiarly, requiring MLIIA wrongful death minors to
institute suit by the arbitrary age of fourteen is illogical, unreasonable,
unjust, and not rationally related to reducing medical liability insurance rates.
claims by age eight. See id. However, even discounting such inequitable restrictions,
these groups have failed to prove that minors' claims are responsible for the large
increases in medical malpractice insurance rates. See Keith, supra note 3, at 322. Further, economists have contended that short statute of limitations, in general, have
failed to control the rising insurance rates, and thus, "the Texas Medical Liability Act
is ...

based upon a fallacy, that there exists a direct cause and effect link between

malpractice rate setting and litigation." Id.
Probably the most difficult element to establish is the causal connection between a decrease in the number and amount of awards and the hoped-for
reduction in malpractice insurance rates. Although sufficient evidence exists
linking the increase in malpractice awards to the insurance crisis, various
other possible causes exist that are unaffected by the reform legislation. It is
therefore almost impossible to predict whether reform legislation will accomplish its goal.
Redish, supra note 5, at 781-82 (citations omitted). In fact, not all the causes of the
malpractice insurance crisis are identifiable. Rather, the crisis involves "complex...
problems involving interacting medical, legal, sociological, psychological, and economic factors." Id. at 760 n.10 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,

PUB. No. (OS) 73-8,

MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE:

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

22,4 (1973)). In sum, while courts would likely
not question the legislative wisdom in attempting to alleviate the medical malpractice
insurance crisis, they should inquire whether the legislation in fact substantially alleviates the crisis. If no data exists to show that limiting minors' right before they reach
majority would substantially lower medical malpractice insurance costs, courts should
overturn the irrational classification. In fact,
Arguments have successfully been made in other situations involving short
limitation statutes affecting narrow classes of plaintiffs that, although the legislature has wide discretion in fixing time limitations, such must be 'reasonable in respect of the class' of persons and places involved. Otherwise, an
injured party has in fact been deprived of any realistic opportunity to present his claim for damages. This situation occurs not because of any fault or
negligence on the part of the would-be plaintiff, but because that plaintiff
had the great misfortune to be injured by a medical or health care provider
professional in the course of treatment, instead of by a reckless driver or
other type of tortfeasor.
Keith, supra note 3, at 324 (citations omitted).
354. See Detar, 694 S.W.2d at 366. The Detar court explained,
We do not believe that, as significantly demonstrated by the spiraling increases in the costs of medical care since the enactment of the statute, there
has been a showing of sufficient societal quid pro quo (i.e. the loss of recovery potential to some malpractice victims as offset by lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for other recipients of medical care) to
justify the limitation on liability imposed by the statute, as applied to seriously injured medical negligence victims....
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
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The MLIIA's requirement that medical wrongful death minors must
institute suit while under disability constitutes an unreasonable restriction. First, the Act discriminates between classes of tort victims
and between children and adults. Second, the ordinary diligent person standard applicable to persons commencing legal proceedings assumes persons are capable of compliance. Children must be free of
disabilities before they are held to the ordinary diligent person standard. Third, the purpose of tolling provisions for minors and incompetent persons is to protect a person who has "no access to the courts,
and to insure that his right to bring suit will not be precluded by the
running of a limitations statute prior to the removal of his
'
disability."355
Minors with medical wrongful death claims are the only group who
are left in the untenable position of attempting to file claims while
under the disability of minority and whose claims are barred before
they escape disability. Such a result defeats the purpose of tolling for
disability. The Pavlovish court aptly identified the dilemma:
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act statute of
limitation provision is the only current provision that imposes such
a strict requirement on minors seeking to bring suit. Section 10.01
has been held unconstitutional as it applies to common-law causes
of action. Yet, the Texas Supreme Court has refused to extend this
rationale to statutorily created causes of action. We agree with our
sister court in the Fourteenth District when it stated:
"If minors are to be given full protection as to the time they are
allowed to bring suit for their personal injuries, appellants who have
lost a parent due to the same type of negligence should
be even
356
equally, if not more, deserving of legal protection."
Minors with medical death claims, like minors with medical personal injury claims and minors with nonmedical death claims, should
not be singled out merely because medical malpractice insurance rates
and health care costs are increasing. As the Waggoner court explained
when it held the MLIIA damages cap was unconstitutional,
Even assuming that such a "crisis" has a basis in fact, it is indisputable that constitutional protections are not suspended in time of even
the most legitimate crises. Constitutional protections exist for litigants regardless of market conditions for insurance companies and
355. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Tzolov v. International Jet Leasing, Inc., 283 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). "Traditionally the interests of minors, incompetents, and other helpless persons are viewed
in law as substantially similar, and both the substantive law and the rules of procedure
accord them comparable treatment." Id.
356. Povolish v. Bethania Reg'l Health Care Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (quoting Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 339 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)) and (citing Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990)).
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the medical industry; concerns about the latter cannot be allowed to
overrun the former at the expense of those who ... were most seriously injured by acts of malpractice.3 57
The Pavlovish court urged the Texas Supreme Court to reassess its
decision in Rose, and to determine whether the MLIIA statute of limitations violates the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution
as it applies to minors.3 58 The Hogan court likewise urged the Texas
Supreme Court to re-visit its decision in Rose, stating, "The equal protection clause was, in our opinion, not fully fleshed out in Rose, and
the court in Sax specifically declined to decide the issue before it on
equal protection grounds. ' 359 The Hogan court also questioned the
legislative wisdom in barring minors from instituting medical wrongful
death claims sooner than are similarly situated nonmedical wrongful
death minors whose claims fall outside the MLIIA, stating,
While it is clear that the legislature has the right to amend and
even abolish its statutory creations, such as the wrongful death statute involved here, it should not have the constitutional power to
amend it in a manner that singles out and discriminates against a
portion of a legally protected class such as minors. To single out
minors aged twelve and under and limit them to age fourteen in
which to bring their actions, while allowing minors of the same ages
pursuing the same wrongful death action against a different type of
tortfeasor to bring their suits by their twentieth birthday, seems unreasonable and arbitrary. If the legislature was limiting all minors
who were asserting wrongful death claims, regardless of the source
of the alleged negligence, the legislative power rationale would be
on firmer constitutional ground. The purpose justifying this different treatment for certain minors also seems constitutionally suspect.
To reduce medical liability insurance premiums is no doubt a worthy goal. But does not the same logic apply to the trucking industry
when one of its vehicles driven negligently causes the death of a
person with minor children? Instead, such minor children are given
two years after their eighteenth birthday to bring their suit for the
wrongful death of a parent, and the trucking industry tortfeasor
pays the higher liability insurance premium. At best, article 4590i,
§ 10.01 seems selective in its legislative purpose, and discriminatory
in its effect.36 °

Although the Rose court held that the legislature has the authority
to limit damage awards for statutory causes of action, the legislature
should not have the authority to premise a minor's recovery upon an
impossible condition precedent, thereby effectively discriminating
against minors filing medical wrongful death claims. Unreasonable
357. Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (citations
omitted).
358. See Povolish, 905 S.W.2d at 68.
359. Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339.

360. See id. at 339-40. See supra notes 42, 61, 63, 142, 148, 199.
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limitations periods imposed to preclude medical wrongful death minors from receiving compensation constitutes disparate treatment
when other similarly situated plaintiffs with similar claims are not subject to similar restrictions. Public policy dictates that minors filing
medical wrongful death claims should receive the same protections as
minors whose parents are wrongfully killed on Texas highways. Because minors with medical wrongful death claims are similarly situated
to minors with nonmedical wrongful death claims, the only apparent
factor justifying this disparate treatment relates to the identity of the
defendant. As such, the MLIIA invidiously discriminates against minors with medical death claims, and violates the equal protection
guarantee of the Texas Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The MLIIA was passed to curb a perceived health care crisis manifested by dramatically increased malpractice insurance rates and decreased public access to affordable health care services. Texas
legislators included an absolute two-year limitations period in the
MLIIA, theorizing that reducing the number and size of malpractice
awards would allow the insurance industry to predict liability which
would lead to reasonable and stable medical malpractice insurance
rates. Although the legislature intended to hold plaintiffs asserting
medical malpractice claims to a strict two-year limitations period, legislators included limited exceptions whereby plaintiffs may gain additional time to institute suit. The disability of minority is one such
exception delineated within the MLIIA. Nonetheless, legislators
failed to provide minors adequate time to institute medical malpractice claims.
As currently written, the MLIIA only preserves minors' claims,
both for personal injury or wrongful death, until age fourteen. However, the Texas Supreme Court, in Weiner v. Wasson, held the time
restriction imposed on minors filing medical personal injury claims
was unconstitutional because it cut off their causes of action prematurely. The time restriction imposed on minors filing medical wrongful death claims is similarly unreasonable. Thus, the Texas Legislature
should amend the MLIIA minority tolling provision to grant minors
two years after attaining majority to file both personal injury and
wrongful death suits. Because the Texas Legislature created the cause
of action, it retains the power to change it. 361 Legislative amendment
of the MLIIA's minority tolling provision is necessary to protect minors with medical wrongful death claims. Such an amendment will
produce uniform and equitable results, will avoid constitutional challenges, is consistent with the general treatment minors receive in tort
law, and protects Texas' children. Alternatively, the Texas Supreme
361. See id.
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Court should hold the MLIIA is unconstitutional as it applies to minors asserting claims because it violates the equal protection clause of
the Texas Constitution by irrationally classifying minors, treating them
inequitably as compared to similarly situated adult wrongful death
beneficiaries or minors asserting nonmedical wrongful death claims
and because the time restrictions imposed on the class of minors fails
to rationally relate to lowering medical malpractice insurance rates,
reducing excessive claims, and ensuring the public access to affordable
health care.
Melissa Lyn McLeod Hamrick
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